Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA by Stevenson, Dru
Volume 112 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 112, 
2007-2008 
6-1-2007 
Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA 
Dru Stevenson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 DICK. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol112/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
I Articles I




I. Introduction: M assachusetts v. EPA ........................................................... 2
II. Background on "Special Solicitude for States ........................................ 19
A . Case-Based Etym ology ............................................................................ 20
B. Commentary-Based Etymology .............................................................. 27
C. Oral Argum ents and Briefs ....................................................................... 29
D . The Chevron M an .................................................................................... 36
III. Special Solicitude for Attorneys General ................................................ 37
A. The Evolving Role of the Attorneys General .......................................... 38
B. From Multistate Enforcement to a New Federalism ................................. 40
C. Self-Selection and Screening Effects ...................................................... 41
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I would like to thank
my colleague Adam Gershowitz for helpful input and suggestions, and Jay Clendenin for
helpful research assistance. Special thanks to Professor Jonathan Masur at the University
of Chicago Law School for reviewing the draft and offering insightful comments and
proposed revisions. Finally, I am indebted to Eric Prock, Frank Pyle, and the terrific
editorial team at the Penn State Law Review, whose careful review and suggested
changes greatly improved this article. The author was an Assistant Attorney General for
the State of Connecticut in 2002-03, when the litigation that led to the Massachusetts v.
EPA decision was in its nascent stages, and had some involvement with research on the
legal issues in the case.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
D . Cooperation and Com petition ................................................................. 47
E. Are Activist Groups Left O ut? .................................... .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .  50
IV. States Compelling Federal Agencies to Regulate ................................... 51
A . M ajority's A nalysis ................................................................................ 52
B . Scalia's D issent ..................................................................................... . . 54
C . C hevron A nalysis ......................................................................................... 57
D. Rulemaking vs. Enforcem ent ................................................................. 60
E. More Standing, More Litigation, More Regulation .................................. 63
1. Knightian Uncertainty & Beneficial Overregulation .................. 64
2. To Whom Is the Law Addressed? ......................... . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . 68
3. Does Regulatory Overlap Dilute the Regulatory Burden? . . . . . . 69
V . C onclusion ............................................................................................ . . 73
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court issued its first decision pertaining
to global warming on April 2, 2007, in the landmark case Massachusetts
v. EPA.1 The Court held that the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) had a statutory duty to promulgate regulations for
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that seem to
contribute to worldwide climate change, or at least to furnish a more
satisfying reason for failing to do so than the EPA previously offered.2
The threshold issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs had standing to
bring the action in the first place.3
After deciding the threshold issue in the affirmative, the Court went
1. Massachusetts v. EPA, - U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
2. Id. at 1462-63. The majority states that under the Clean Air Act, the EPA must
regulate carbon dioxide emissions if it makes a finding of endangerment. Id. at 1462.
Since the EPA's purported reasons for not regulating emissions were unrelated to the
question of whether emissions contribute to climate change, the EPA had not conformed
to the CAA. Id.
3. Id. at 1446 (noting at the outset that before the Court could reach the merits-
that is, to answer questions of whether the EPA had statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions and whether the EPA could decline to do so within its statutory
discretion-it had to pass on the question of whether the plaintiff had Article III
standing). After a lengthy introduction about the global warming controversy, and the
meandering procedural history of the case, the Court finally commences its discussion of
the threshold standing question. Id. at 1452. After moving through the standard
boilcrplate of traditional quotes about standing, the majority offers its bottom line,
general rule: "a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to
the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury." Id. at
1453 (citation omitted). It then relies on its previous decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) for the notion that a court may relax the immediacy and
redressibility requirements for Article III standing where some statutory right to sue
exists for certain types of harms, as with citizen suits for Clean Air Act violations.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1453. Most significantly the Court then states that
the standing prerequisites should be further relaxed if the plaintiff is a state, given the
tradeoffs that sovereign states make in joining the Union. Id. at 1454.
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on to reject the EPA's contentions (inconsistent with the agency's
previous positions on the matter 4) that it lacked statutory authority to
regulate greenhouse gases from automobiles and that it was free to
abstain from regulating even if it did have such authority. 5 A consortium
of states,6 government entities, 7 and activist groups 8 comprised each side
of the litigation, and garlands of amici briefs came from the regulated
industries,9 specialized advocacy groups, and policy celebrities ranging
4. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449 ("In 1998, Jonathan Z. Cannon,
then EPA's General Counsel, prepared a legal opinion concluding that 'C02 emissions
are within the scope of EPA's authority to regulate,' even as he recognized that EPA had
so far declined to exercise that authority.") (citing Memorandum to Carol M. Browner,
Administrator (Apr. 10, 1998) ("Canon memorandum")); see also id. at 1461 ("Prior to
the order that provoked this litigation, EPA had never disavowed the authority to regulate
greenhouse gases, and in 1998 it in fact affirmed that it had such authority.") (emphasis
in original) (citing the Cannon memorandum).
5. See id. at 1459 (saying that the Court has "little trouble concluding" that
§ 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases).
6. See id. at 1446 n.2 (noting that California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington banded together on the plaintiffs side). Siding with the EPA were
Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas,
and Utah. Id. at 1447 n.5. It should be noted that six additional states, Arizona,
Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, filed briefs as amici curiae in
support of the petitioner states.
7. See id. at 1446 n.3. Besides the EPA's involvement as the defendant in the case,
the District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore joined on the
plaintiffs side. Id. No such entities joined on the defendants' side. It is not clear if the
special solicitude for state standing that the Court sets forth in this opinion also applies to
municipalities and territories.
8. See id. at 1446-67 nn.4 & 6. On the plaintiffs' side were the Center for
Biological Diversity, the Center for Food Safety, the Conservation Law Foundation,
Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace,
International Center for Technology Assessment, the National Environmental Trust, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and
U.S. Public Interest Research Group. Id. at 1446 n.4. Siding with the EPA as litigants
were the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the National Automobile Dealers
Association, the Engine Manufacturers Association, The Truck Manufacturers
Association, the C02 Litigation Group, and the Utility Air Regulatory Group. Id. at 1447
n.6.
9. See Brief of William J. Baumol et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL
3043972, supporting numerous local (state and municipal level) automobile dealers'
associations; Brief of Amicus Curiae William H. Taft, IV in Support of Respondents,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3095444, funded
by the Automotive Trade Policy Council; Amicus Curiae Jerome B. Carr, Ph.D. to File a
Brief in Support of the Respondents, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No.
05-1120), 2006 WL 2817216; Brief for Entergy Corporation As Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120),
2006 WL 2540802; see also Brief For Respondents Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers et al., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006
WL 3023028.
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from Madeline Albrightl ° to Robert Bork."1 An interestingly pragmatic
brief, contrary-to-interest, came from the Entergy Corporation,
2
pleading for some sensible regulations now instead of sudden, drastic
regulations at some uncertain point in the future.'
3
The ruling is truly a landmark decision in environmental law,
especially in the highly controversial area of mitigating climate change
through legal mechanisms.14 The case presents a host of implications for
the role of the EPA in worldwide protection of the environment, the
proper occasions for the federal judiciary to intervene in highly debated
public policy matters, and even for divining the current political
composition of the Supreme Court. 15  Perhaps the most far-reaching
10. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Madeleine K. Albright in Support of Petitioners,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2570988.
11. See Brief of Amici Curiae Robert H. Bork et al. in Support of Respondent United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3101954.
12. Brief for Entergy Corporation As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2540802.
Entergy urges the Court to find that greenhouse gas emissions are "air pollutants" under
the CAA, and therefore should be regulated. Id. at *28. It goes on to say that
government regulation is an economic method to employ in solving the climate change
dilemma. Id.
13. See id. at * 1-4.
14. Brief of Amici Curiae Robert H. Bork et al., supra note 11, at *3-4. In his
summary of what the plaintiffs in the case are attempting to do, Bork says that the suit is,
in effect, merely an attempt to employ the Court to implement global environmental
policies. Id. at *9. He notes that the original petition from 1999 states that the plaintiffs
more or less admit to using the courts as a tool (i.e. legal mechanism) in order to reduce
the effects of global warming. Id. at *3.
15. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446-51 (2007). Bork discusses the
case in light of United States policy and the United Nations. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Robert H. Bork et al., supra note 11. He argues that the question at hand (i.e. whether or
not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars) is solely a political one, one that
should be left to the "political branches." Id. at *3-4. The decision on whether to
regulate should not be contravened by the courts, especially in light of the fact that global
warming necessarily implicates many nations and governments and cannot be addressed
by the United States alone. Id. at *4. This seems to be a practical argument (in addition
to the Constitutional implications), in that Bork is advocating against allowing plaintiffs
to turn the Court into a policymaker. Doing so would likely be inefficient since the Court
does not have the same political tools at its disposal (i.e. power to negotiate treaties).
Since the United States Congress and the President have both been active in formulating
policies to address global warming, he says that the issue is clearly a political one and
should not be addressed through the courts (this was also a basis that the EPA relied on in
denying the petition for rulemaking). Id. at *4-10. Aside from U.S. policy, he says that
the debate in the United Nations illustrate the global nature of the issue of global
warming and the fact that the United States alone cannot solve the problem. Id. at *6-9.
Therefore, he advocates against allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the policy arguments by
going straight through the courts in order to effectuate their own policy. Id. at *9-10.
This also involves economic considerations (i.e. whether it is more efficient for each
individual country to address global warming through its own courts, or if the problem is
better addressed through a collective body where all parties agree to a common
[Vol. 112:1
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implications, however, are for administrative law more generally: the
question of standing for challenging inaction by an administrative
agency. 16
The Court adopted what appears to be a new rule, or at least a rule
that it had never before made explicit: the states have "special
solicitude" to obtain standing to sue federal agencies. 17  As Justice
Roberts observes in his (overly anxious) dissent, the "special solicitude"
rule for state standing appears to be unprecedented in the Supreme
Court's history, and is even mysteriously absent from the gaggle of briefs
(by parties and amici) filed in the case.' 8 Roberts' tone is excessively
approach).
16. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1471 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (warning
that the relaxed standing requirements permit the Court to enter the political arena where
a plaintiff state seeks force agency action). Of course, every case about standing is open
to the charge of being results-driven, and this case is no exception. To the extent that one
subscribes to the view that standing is nothing but a smokescreen for the court to get the
result it wants (that is, based on the merits), neither this case nor any other standing case
could have any control or etiological effect on future cases. Yet earlier Supreme Court
decisions on standing have had an undeniable effect on lower courts, regardless of
whether the Supreme Court was playing a game in the original ruling. For example,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)
had an instant impact on standing cases in federal courts. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp,, 204 F.3d 149, 162-63 (4th Cir. 2000) (overruling
a lower court's denial of standing in light of Laidlaw); Ecological Rights Found. v.
Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the new Laidlaw
rule to grant standing). For more discussion, see ROGER W. FINDLEY, DANIEL A. FARBER,
AND JODY FREEMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 114-15 (6th ed. 2003).
17. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 ("Given that procedural right
[to bring citizen suits to compel enforcement of the Clean Air Act] and Massachusetts'
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special
solicitude in our standing analysis."). The majority explains why states are entitled to
relaxed standing requirements, saying that because states forfeit certain rights when
entering the union (such as treaty power, the right to invade other states, and federal
preemption) they are entitled to special solicitude in standing analysis. Id. at 1454. In
response to the dissent's accusation that the majority has created a new standing doctrine,
the Court relies on a secondary source's interpretation of its standing jurisprudence to
support its conclusion that a state has standing to sue a federal agency in order to force it
to regulate. Id. at 1455. Its interpretation of"parens patriae" cases leads the majority to
decide that states have so called special solicitude. Thus, the majority concludes that
Massachusetts has met "the most demanding standards of the adversarial process." Id.
The majority even says that the judicial review provision in the CAA gives states the
right to challenge agency action as arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1454.
18. See id. at 1464 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("Relaxing Article III standing
requirements because asserted injuries are pressed by a State, however, has no basis in
our jurisprudence, and support for any such 'special solicitude' is conspicuously absent
from the Court's opinion ... ").
Although no one invoked the phrase "special solicitude" in the briefs or at oral
argument, Roberts fails to mention (as does the majority, for that matter), that there was a
passing discussion at oral argument about the notion that states should have automatic or
"special" standing, at least when there is a preemption problem looming. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006
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apocalyptic about the consequences of this novel move by the majority,
but he seems correct that it is a new direction for the Court. This essay
focuses on the new "special solicitude" rule, its implications for the
office of state Attorney General, and its interrelation with the Court's
willingness to compel a federal agency to regulate against its will.
The majority, represented by Justice Stevens, based this special
solicitude rule mostly on three concerns, each a component of the states'
dependence on the federal government to protect and provide for the
members of the Union. 19 First, individual states lack recourse against
other states for pollution (or other externalized harms) that they foist
upon their neighbors. 20 "Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island21 to
force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions," the Court quips. The
states must appeal to the federal government-either courts or
agencies-to resolve problems of interstate externalities. Moreover, the
Constitution bars individual states from negotiating their own treaties
with foreign nations, such as China and India,23 the two main
contributors of greenhouse gases besides the United States. 24  This is
WL 3431932 (Nov. 29, 2006). Justice Kennedy first brought it up, asking the
Massachusetts Attorney General, "[d]o you have some special standing as a state... "
Id. at * 14. Seizing the thought, Mr. Milkey tried to point the Court to West Virginia v.
EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (2004), where the D.C. Circuit apparently granted standing on
this basis. Id. at * 15. The conversation then shifted to a discussion of the Massachusetts
coastline, and then Justice Scalia's concern that this would be another S.C.R.A.P. case
(that is, of marginal precedential value). Justice Ginsburg interrupted the discussion and
asked if this was a claim of discreet standing for sovereign states confronted by
preemption problems. Id. at * 16-17. Mr. Milkey hastily agreed. Id. Justice Scalia then
stated the issue nicely: "I don't understand that. You have standing whenever a Federal
law preempts state action? You can complain about the implementation of that law
because it has preempted your state action? Is that the basis of standing you're alleging?"
Id. at * 17. Mr. Milkey responded by pointing to the amici brief filed by Arizona and
several other states, which cited a few circuit court cases supporting that notion; then the
discussion turned back to the Clean Air Act itself. Id. The oral arguments and the cases
alluded to therein are the subject of Section II.C., infra.
19. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (These sovereign prerogatives are
now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect
Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to the "emission of
any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the
Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." (citation omitted)).
20. Id.
21. Rhode Island was actually a co-plaintiff with Massachusetts in this case. Their
juxtaposition is the only reason to suggest a conflict between the two.
22. Id.
23. Brief of Amici Curiae Robert H. Bork et al., supra note 11, at *9 (noting that
China, India, and South Korea are not bound by the reductions required by the Kyoto
Protocol).
24. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449 (discussing the history surrounding
legislation and international efforts addressing global warming, and noting that the U.S.
opted not to sign on to the Kyoto Protocol because the two other greatest polluters were
[Vol. 1 12:1
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probably an allusion to the Kyoto Protocol, a treaty the federal
government repudiated, which would have been the primary instrument
of international law for addressing manmade climate change. The
relatively free ride given to China and India under the Protocol was the
main justification for its lack of federal endorsement.2 5
Third, Justice Stevens notes that the states cannot even enact their
own internal regulations to control the problem within their borders
because of preemption problems.26  Once Congress steps into an area,
states may be unable to issue their own regulations, even to fill in gaps in
the existing federal regulatory regime (such as the lack of federal
standards for carbon dioxide emission). 27 This may be an ominous hint
about the prospects of some of the pending litigation about CO2
28emissions, cases that have not yet reached the Court. In fact, several
states have recently enacted their own regulations, 29 which the
automobile industry has challenged, 30 and Justice Stevens may have been
not required to reduce their pollution levels).
25. See id. Justice Stevens states rather clearly:
UJNFCCC signatories met in Kyoto, Japan, and adopted a protocol that assigned
mandatory targets for industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Because those targets did not apply to developing and heavily
polluting nations such as China and India, the Senate unanimously passed a
resolution expressing its sense that the United States should not enter into the
Kyoto Protocol.
Id. For more discussion, see Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877 (2006).
26. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (".... in some circumstances the
exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be
pre-empted.").
27. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing "field
preemption," the doctrine that states where federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it").
28. See, e.g., People v. Gen. Motors Corp. et al., No. 06-05755, complaint filed
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Benjamin P. Harper, Note, Climate Change Litigation:
The Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance and Federalism Concerns, 40 GA. L.
REV. 661 (2006); Hari Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation:
Implications For Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 1789
(2005).
29. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West Supp. 2005); 310
MASS. CODE REGS. 7.29(5)(a)(5) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-0:3 (2005); OR.
REV. STAT. § 469.503 (2003); Suffolk County, N.Y., Laws ch. 235, §235-3; see also
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org; California, Washington, and
Oregon have agreed to explore a similar proposal, see Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, West Coast States Strengthen Joint Climate Protection Strategy (Nov. 18, 2004),
http://www.calepa.ca.gov/PressRoom/Releases/2004/WCClimate.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663
AWl LJO, 2007 WL 135688, (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007); see examples cited in Note,
Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1877 (2006). Of course, California has special status to avoid preemption
under the Clean Air Act where other states do not. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1990).
20071
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signaling that the Supreme Court will find these regulations preempted,
at least in some circumstances.
For these three reasons, therefore, the majority concludes that the
states deserve special treatment or leniency in actions to compel federal
agencies to protect their well-being. 3' The states voluntarily joined the
Union, Stevens observes, and surrendered the rights they would
otherwise have had in each of these three domains (threatening force
against contiguous neighbors, consummating treaties with other
countries, and even passing their own laws and regulations) in order to
participate in the greater Nation.32 Without these powers, the states are
somewhat helpless and vulnerable, unless the federal government affords
commensurate protections in return. 33  In a sense, it is a matter of
symmetry. Rights and privileges that the states yield or concede to the
federal government create a duty for the federal government to stand in
the states' shoes, and even to act at their behest. 34 The mechanism for
preserving this symmetry is in the grant of standing to sue. Nationwide
democratic elections for Washington officeholders are not enough.35
As the dissent makes clear, the Court stands divided on this issue
and the split is nearly even. Four Justices (predictably, Roberts, Alito,
Scalia, and Thomas) 36 were completely opposed to the idea of giving the
states standing. A change of one swing vote, or a replacement of one
Justice from the majority, could lead to a reversal in future cases, or at
least a narrowing of the rule. For example, a future court could
distinguish this case on the grounds that it pertains exclusively to
regulations under the Clean Air Act, which already mandates intense
state participation in the creation of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to
meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for certain
air pollutants.37 If another case involves a regulatory regime that
31. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
32. See id.
33. See id. The majority says that since the listed "sovereign prerogatives" vest
solely in the federal government, Congress has ordered the EPA to regulate emissions in
order to protect the states. Id. The opinion does not, however, cite any law that provides
states with a different threshold for standing.
34. See id. at 1455 ("With that in mind, it is clear that petitioners' submissions as
they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the
adversarial process. EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent."')
35. But see id. at 1471 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (saying that the Court's holding
transgresses on the "proper... role of the courts in a democratic society").
36. See id. at 1463.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000). The connection between the plaintiff's special
entitlement to standing in this case due to its special participatory role under the Clean
Air Act was alluded to during oral arguments before the Supreme Court. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006
WL 3431932 (Nov. 29, 2006).
[Vol. 112:1
SPECIAL SOLICITUDE FOR STATE STANDING
generally excludes state involvement, it might furnish a basis for
distinguishing Massachusetts v. EPA and narrowing its applicability.
38
Rather than argue the merits of the new "special solicitude" rule,
this article embraces it and attempts to anticipate some of its direct and
indirect effects. The idea of state standing to sue is separate from the
partisan positions on global warming. In fact, previous cases have had
Scalia and Thomas insisting on special deference for states (unrelated to
standing), with Stevens et al. decrying their "special solicitude" for states
in a dissent.39
In practice, Massachusetts v. EPA really creates special solicitude
for state Attorneys General (AG's), not simply for states. In this case,
each state involved in the litigation, nearly half the states in the Union,
participated vicariously through its Attorney General.4 0 Each AG chose
sides and made the decision to litigate independently of other
government officials, such as the governors.4' Relaxed standing
requirements for states mean fewer hurdles for policy-oriented litigation
by the state AG's. Each AG will have more incentive to devote
resources to such endeavors, now that the costs are lower and the
42chances of success are greater.
Even before this case, the role of the AG was evolving from
Counsel for the Executive Brach into the People's Lawyer;43 now it is
38. The first case to cite Massachusetts v. EPA, remarkably, cited it for the
proposition that judicial review of EPA actions is very limited and highly deferential; this
is, of course, the very court that was reversed in the Massachusetts v. EPA case. See
Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 484 F.Supp.2d 44, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25161, at
* 13 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2007). Of course, any ruling that allows standing for new plaintiffs
could arguably expend judicial power, because more plaintiffs can file cases and more
judicial review will occur. Even if future courts disagree with the specific result in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the decision provides courts with more opportunities to review
and scrutinize agency decisions in other regulatory fields.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 648 (2000).
40. See supra note 6 and states listed therein.
41. See generally Patrick C. McGinley, Separation of Powers, State Constitutions &
the Attorney General: Who Represents the State?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 721 (1997); Erin L.
Penn, Perdue v. Baker: Who Has the Ultimate Power Over Litigation on Behalf of the
State of Georgia-The Governor or the Attorney General?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 751
(2005) (discussing a controversial redistricting appeal, where a newly-elected governor
asked the state AG to withdraw the suit initiated by his predecessor (from the other
political party), and the AG refused). More recently, the model of the divided executive
branch (as seen on the state level) has emerged as a proposal for limited Presidential
powers as well. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2246 (2006).
42. See generally Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National
Environmental Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335 (2005); Hon. Richard Blumenthal,
The Role of State Attorneys General, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1207 (2001); Symposium, State
Attorney General Litigation: Regulation through Litigation and the Separation of
Powers: Roundtable, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 617 (2001).
43. See Justin G. Davids, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney
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much more so. In forty-three states, the Attorney General is an elected
position, 44 on the general ballot along with the governor and legislators.
With the special solicitude rule, the state Attorney General position takes
on more significance for national public policy concerns, as the citizenry
realizes that its choice of candidate can affect what litigation ensues and
which side its state will take.
It seems likely that national policy concerns will become a
campaign issue in the elections45 for state AG's, given the greater ease by
which the AG can bring actions against federal agencies to compel
regulation of certain areas. The elections themselves will have higher
stakes as a result, and will attract more media coverage, more policy
debate, and probably more campaign spending given the farther reach of
the office.
4 6
Relationship: Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 365, 366 (2005) ("[Colorado Attorney General] Salazar's position: As the
people's lawyer he had the authority to bring a suit to determine the constitutionality of
the redistricting plan."); Bill Aleshire, Note, The Texas Attorney General: Attorney Or
General?, 20 REV. LITIG. 187, 190-91 (2000) ("This claim is based on the notion that the
Attorney General is 'the people's lawyer,' possessing the duty and authority to represent
the 'public interest' client instead of any other state government client. Such a role can
place the Attorney General in a watchdog position .. "); Don LeDuc, Michigan
Administrative Law, October Term, 1994-95, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 341, 371 (1996)
(describing Michigan AG as the "People's lawyer" instead of the governor's counsel).
44. See, e.g., National Association of Attorneys General, The Attorneys General,
http://www.naag.org/naag/about-naag.phpt (stating that:
The Attorney General is popularly elected in 43 states, as well as in Guam, and
is appointed by the governor in five states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Wyoming) and in the four jurisdictions of American Samoa,
the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In Maine,
the Attorney General is selected by secret ballot of the legislature and in
Tennessee, by the state Supreme Court. In the District of Columbia, the Mayor
appoints the Attorney General whose powers and duties are similar to those of
the Attorneys General of the states and jurisdictions.).
See also William P. Marshall, supra note 41, at 2448; Sheila B. Scheuerman, The
Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining In Abuse By Requiring Plaintiffs To Allege
Reliance As An Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 36 n.266 (2006); Peter
Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General Can
Enforce State Wage And Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 495, 546 (2006).
45. For an example of how global warming has become a campaign issue, see
Steven Milloy, Love Fest on the Hill, WASH. TIMES, March 25, 2007, at B01, (".. Mrs.
Boxer doesn't want legislation this year, preferring instead to have global warming as a
campaign issue in 2008.").
46. It seems to me that the conflation of policymaking and litigation, regardless of its
possible benefits and rewards, introduces a disproportionate degree of moral luck into the
individual AG's prospects. Some of this national-level litigation will be very successful
and produce pleasant results that everyone appreciates, but in other cases, unintended
consequences could leave the voters sour on the whole venture. The ultimate effects and
outcome are largely outside the control of the individual AG. For example, compelling a
federal agency to promulgate rules could yield bad/undesirable rules that are worse than
no rules at all, or could result in rules that the agency refuses to enforce, at least for the
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This shift in the nature of the Attorney General's role should also
affect the type of candidates who run for the position. Those with more
opinions on national policy issues (and perhaps with national-level
aspirations) will be more attracted to the office.4 7 Those who can better
articulate their positions on these matters will have more appeal to
voters, and at least one of the candidates is likely to make some
prospective litigation an issue in the campaign, forcing both sides to
address it. This will necessarily have a screening effect on the type of
time being. See also Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, reprinted in
MORAL LUCK 1-120 (1981); see also CLAUDIA CARD, THE UNNATURAL LOTTERY:
CHARACTER AND MORAL LUCK 32 (1996).
47. To some extent, this new focus on the role of the AG shifts the potential personal
reward of the office from one of achievement to one of accomplishment. Achievements
are remarkable things to which we attain, like titles and positions. Accomplishments are
the remarkable things we actually do, the ways with which we operate as individual
agents of change. The traditional role of the state AG was more of an achievement; the
public service involved could be somewhat pedantic as far as litigation goes, and the
office was typically a stepping-stone to a Senate seat or the Governor's mansion. With
the special solicitude rule, however, each AG has the potential to be an agent of change
on the national level, to accomplish things instead of achieving them.
For a brief discussion of this distinction made by philosophers from Aristotle
(Metaphysics) through Vendler and Kenny, see Daniel W. Graham, States and
Performances: Aristotle's Test, 30 PHIL. Q. 117, 118-19 (1980). Graham focuses most of
his discussion, however, on Aristotle's Greek syntax and the subsequent commentaries,
rather than the implications for evaluating the careers of public officials. Id. at 118-21.
Philosopher Zeno Vendler himself makes much of the different semantic traits of
"accomplishment" verbal statements, versus "achievement" verbs. The former use more
continuous-past-action verbs, for example, than the former. See Zeno Vendler, Verbs and
Times, 66 PHIL. REV. 143, 145-48 (1957). Unsurprisingly, some sociologists see the
distinction as a product of societal changes that affect the criteria for the development of
self-esteem. See, e.g., David D. Franks and Joseph Marolla, Efficacious Action and
Social Approval as Interacting Dimensions of Self-Esteem: A Tentative Formulation
Through Construct Validation, 39 SOCIOMETRY 324, 338-39 (1976). Vendler notes in a
digression that one odd semantic difference between accomplishments and achievements
in speech is that the former are actions where the helping verb "can" is added or removed
without much change in meaning, while achievement-related verbs are drastically
affected by the presence of "can" or "could." See Vendler, 66 PHIL. REV. at 148-49,
whose example is the semantic equivalency of"I can believe that," with "I believe that."
Of course, "achievement" and "accomplishment" are sometimes used
interchangeably, especially in cases where precise definitions of these terms are of less
significance. See, e.g., Thomas A. Wright & Douglas G. Bonett, The Contribution of
Burnout to Work Performance, 18 J. ORG. BEHAV. 491, 494 (1997) ("The third burnout
dimension, diminished personal accomplishment, denotes a decline in one's personal
feelings of competence and successful work achievement.") (citation omitted); see also
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Why Does Jane Read and Write So Well? The Anomaly of
Women's Achievement, 62 SOC. OF EDUC. 47 (1989) (discussing the puzzle of exemplary
female academic performance where rewards for such accomplishments or achievements
are hindered by sexism in society); Richard A. Guzzo, Types of Rewards, Cognitions, and
Work Motivation, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 75 (1979); Wagner A. Kamakura & Thomas P.
Novak, Value-System Segmentation: Exploring the Meaning of LOV [List of Values], 19
J. CONSUMER RES. 119, 120-21 (1992) (defining the internal value of "achievement" as
being comprised of social recognition as well as a feeling of "accomplishment").
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person who fills these positions, as well as the expectations of his or her
constituents. This is not necessarily bad; one could see it as another
democratic outlet, a new source of democratic accountability for
unelected officials in federal agencies. On the other hand, the higher
stakes will also attract more lobbyists to the state Attorneys General for
lobbying activities that would previously have been concentrated in
Washington.
Another indirect effect of the special solicitude rule is the increase
in both cooperation and competition between state Attorneys General.48
At present, the AG's like to build consortiums to litigate on their side of
an issue,49 partly as a way of pooling resources, and partly for the
increased credibility that comes from greater numbers and greater
geographical diversity on the same side of a case.50 As state-led cases
become more prevalent (the logical outcome of relaxed standing
requirements), a state Attorney General will need to cooperate and
collaborate more with his or her counterparts from other states than ever
before; litigation teamwork with other AG's thus becomes part of the job
description. At the same time, within these consortiums or alliances
there are tussles over which state will take the lead position in a high-
profile case.51  Such publicity is important for elected officials. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the decision was strategic: everyone knew that the
"injury-in-fact" requirement for standing under Article III would be the
lynchpin of the case. Massachusetts' comparatively long coastline and
the state government's ownership of significant stretches of beach
5 2
48. For an excellent discussion of the cooperative alliances between the AGs in
multistate litigation, see Jason Lynch, Comment, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and
the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1998
(2001).
49. See id. at 2003-08.
50. See id. (describing these effects for multistate antitrust and consumer protection
cases, as well as the tobacco litigation).
51. See id. at 2004 (noting that so far, the states appear to be "so closely coordinated
that those participating in the case will usually choose one or two lead states and cede to
them primary responsibility for negotiating with the defendant on behalf of all the states
involved."). Regardless of the outward appearance of a unified front and a designated
leader, from the perspective of someone working inside an AG office at the phase when
the global warming cases were still under contemplation, this writer can attest that
internal discussions about who gets to lead can be animated.
52. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007).
These rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts' coastal land.
Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal
property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.
The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next
century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official
believes that a significant fraction of coastal property will be either
permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic storm
surge and flooding events.
[Vol. 112:1
SPECIAL SOLICITUDE FOR STATE STANDING
made for a more colorable argument of injury or prospective loss from
rising sea levels.53 This may also explain Alaska's otherwise striking
membership in the opposing consortium, if the defendants recruited the
state with the longest coastline of all to offset this point. If a particular
case is likely to be popular with citizens from several states, there can be
a race to be the first state to file suit to lock in the state's name in the
case caption before others join.
The special solicitude rule is also likely to diminish the role of
activist groups, like the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) or
Sierra Club, for litigation against federal agencies. Such groups now
have an inferior position, at least regarding standing, compared to the
state Attorneys General. Constituents who want policy changes would
naturally prefer a representative who has a magic token for standing, so
those who previously backed private nonprofit activist groups are more
likely to look to the Attorneys General for this purpose.54 The declining
litigation role for activist groups will probably lead to an internal
organizational shift toward other activities, like education, publicity, and
lobbying. Of course, the Massachusetts v. EPA case began with special
interest groups who petitioned the EPA for rulemaking under the Clean
Air Act, so in a sense they initiated the case. 55  That was before the
"special solicitude" rule came into play, however.
The replacement of the private activist groups with the state AG's
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
53. Seeid. n.19.
For example, the [Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation]
owns, operates and maintains approximately 53 coastal state parks, beaches,
reservations, and wildlife sanctuaries. [It] also owns, operates and maintains
sporting and recreational facilities in coastal areas, including numerous pools,
skating rinks, playgrounds, playing fields, former coastal fortifications, public
stages, museums, bike trails, tennis courts, boathouses and boat ramps and
landings. Associated with these coastal properties and facilities is a significant
amount of infrastructure, which the Commonwealth also owns, operates and
maintains, including roads, parkways, storm-water pump stations, piers, sea
wall revetments and dams.
Id. (citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Korsinsky v. EPA, 192 Fed. Appx. 71 (2nd Cir. Aug. 10, 2006)
("Korsinsky's primary claim, that global warming and carbon dioxide emissions may
cause him a future injury, is too speculative to establish standing.") (citation omitted).
55. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449 n.15. Nineteen activist groups
commenced the litigation with a rulemaking petition under the Clean Air Act. See id.
These groups were Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power Technologies,
Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries Assn.; Clements
Environmental Corp.; Environmental Advocates; Environmental and Energy Study
Institute; Friends of the Earth; Full Circle Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode
Island; Greenpeace USA; International Center for Technology Assessment; Network for
Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ; New Jersey
Environmental Watch; New Mexico Solar Energy Assn.; Oregon Environmental Council;
Public Citizen; Solar Energy Industries Assn.; The SUN DAY Campaign. Id.
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
could alter the nature of the litigation, as the AG's have a broader range
of constituents to appease-including large numbers of moderates who
prefer less radical policy changes, or demands for reform, than the
stereotypical member of an activist group like the NRDC. Even so,
offsetting the tempered demands are the greater litigation resources and
sophistication of the AG's office (multiplied as consortiums of states
band together), which bears upon strategic decisions about the case, as
the plaintiffs can commit to a longer term of involvement.
The corollary holding in Massachusetts v. EPA was that the states
could attack federal inaction and compel agencies to regulate.56 This is a
significant additional enhancement of states' rights in light of the special
solicitude rule on standing. Together, the holdings provide states
standing to force the hand of the federal government, at least in
promulgating regulations. 7  The Court, however, drew a bright line
between agency enforcement and rulemaking. 58 Agencies retain much
more discretion about enforcement-whether to enforce, when to
enforce, remedies to seek, etc. 59 The Court does not mention its recent
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales decision,60 but the pattern is consistent.
Agencies have less discretion about promulgating rules than they do
about enforcing them.61 Presumably, the states would find themselves
less successful in future attempts to force agencies to increase
enforcement of rules that are already in place.
For purposes of greenhouse gas emissions this means, in theory, that
the agency could thwart the plaintiff's victory in Massachusetts v. EPA
by refusing to enforce whatever regulations it makes.62 This is another
56. Id. at 1454 (saying that states have a right to challenge agency inaction as
arbitrary and capricious, in effect compelling them to regulate).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1459 (stating that courts provide a lot of discretion to the agencies in
deciding whether to bring an enforcement action, and such decision is usually not subject
to judicial review). However, the majority says that the amount of discretion afforded to
a denial of a petition for rulemaking is more rigorous. Id. The Court says that the CAA
allows the Court to reverse such a denial if it is arbitrary and capricious. Id.
59. Id.
60. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). In this case, the
Supreme Court held that state law did not give a woman the right to force the
police to enforce a restraining order against her husband. Id. at 765-66. The
case deals heavily with issues of due process and property interests, however the
issue is very similar to that in Massachusetts v. EPA. Both cases address
whether a plaintiff can force a government entity to do a certain action. Where
in Massachusetts v. EPA the Court held that the state could compel the EPA to
engage in rulemaking, the Court in Castle Rock held that the plaintiff could not
force the police to enforce a restraining order. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 765.
61. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1458.
62. See id. at 1463.
We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must make
an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform EPA's actions
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reason the dissenting opinions seem overstated. Drastic changes are not
imminent: even apart from the lengthy process of making the Court-
required rules, the EPA may not do much to enforce them until there is a
change in the Administration (that is, the Presidency).63
This does not make the holding meaningless. There is a chronic
problem of path dependence64 for agency rulemaking.65 It is much easier
to tweak existing regulations, or to step up enforcement, than it is to
promulgate new rules from scratch. Once a basic regulatory framework
for greenhouse gas emissions is in place, it will become much easier for
future Administrations to ratchet up the rules or. to intensify the EPA's
enforcement efforts. 66 There is significant value, therefore, in forcing an
agency to create rules where none exists.
The Court's distinction between rulemaking and enforcement
67
in the event that it makes such a finding. We hold only that EPA must ground
its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
63. See id. at 1459.
[Agency] discretion is at its height when the agency decides not to bring an
enforcement action. Therefore, in Heckler v. Chaney, . . . we held that an
agency's refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily subject to
judicial review. Some debate remains, however, as to the rigor with which we
review an agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking.
Id. (citation omitted).
64. For a general introduction to the concept of path dependence in law and
economics, see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, And
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
65. See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case For Top-Down
Corporate Law Harmonization In The European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 939,
954-55 (2006); Paul Teske, Wither the States? Comments on the Daca Federal-State
Framework, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 365, 369 (2006); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC
at 70: Time For Retirement? 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1086-87 (2005); Donald T.
Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913,
928 (2005); Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental
Law and Public Health Protection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10363, 10365 (2002)
("Environmental health regulation is path-dependent: actions taken now affect the nature
of actions taken later."); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV.
1227, 1334 n.458 (1995) ("One wonders in light of the history of securities regulation
how much the heavily substantive approach of contemporary environmental law owes to
path dependence concerning the choices of original legal strategies rather than to
deliberative choice.").
66. See, e.g., Milloy, supra note 45 at B01; see also Kim Chipman, Some Desert
Bush on Global Warming, PiTr. POST-GAZETTE, April 30, 2006, at A11.
The shift has given fresh hope to lawmakers such as Sens. John McCain, an
Arizona Republican, and Joseph Lieberman, a Connecticut Democrat, who are
co-sponsors of legislation to limit carbon emissions. Mr. McCain is expected
to push for another Senate vote on the measure this year and says he's prepared
to make climate change a campaign issue if he runs for president in 2008.
Chipman, Some Desert Bush on Global Warming at A 1l.
67. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459.
There are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an
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makes sense, even apart from the venerable line of cases the Court cites.
It is easier to find a statutory mandate or duty for the former; the latter
must, by necessity, be more discretionary. Rulemaking is much more
costly and lengthy due to the APA notice-and-comment requirements
and the "hard look" doctrine, which has the effect of inducing agencies
to beef up the "record" in a case with a dizzying array of internal
memoranda, minutes of meetings, and detailed scientific studies.68
Agencies are loath to sink scarce resources into new rulemaking,
especially in controversial areas. The rulemaking process, being more
tedious and less flexible than enforcement, is therefore less responsive to
genuine crises or public outcry for government action.69 If either agency
activity needs a push from the courts, it would be rulemaking rather than
enforcement.
The prospect of states having more freedom (or legal power) to
compel federal regulation could force Congress to be clearer in future
enactments about when the agency has a duty to regulate, and when it is
a matter of agency discretion. Currently, the "enabling statutes," those
pieces of legislation that delegate authority to an agency to make and
enforce rules that execute the will of Congress, are woefully ambiguous
and inconsistent about when agencies can regulate and when they must
regulate. Massachusetts v. EPA arguably allows and invites states to
settle that question for the agency in many settings. If Congress
previously intended that very ambiguity to delegate discretion to the
agency in this regard, the Court has now re-delegated at least some of
that discretion to the states instead. Split delegations of power between
the states and a federal agency are not new, as the Clean Air Act did that
from the beginning. Before, however, the delegation did not come in the
form of an option that states could exercise, and this appears to be the
case now. This new "option-exercise delegation" may compel Congress
agency's decision not to initiate an enforcement action .... In contrast to
nonenforcement decisions, agency refusals to initiate rulemaking are less
frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject
to special formalities, including a public explanation.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
68. See Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied 417 U.S. 921 (1974) ("[The] agency, particularly when its decisions can
literally mean survival of persons or property, has a continuing duty to take a 'hard look'
at the problems involved in its regulatory task, and that includes an obligation to
comment on matters identified as potentially significant by the court order .. "). For a
discussion of the costs for agencies in promulgating rules subject to judicial scrutiny, see
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120
HARV. L. REv. 528 (2006).
69. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99-110
(2d ed. 2001).
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to change the way it drafts enabling statutes.
Giving fifty more political entities a say in whether new regulations
are necessary would logically lead to more regulations overall. The
Court did not give states a right to forestall or veto federal regulations;
the option-delegation pertains only to the commencement of rulemaking,
not to force repeal. More regulation is not always a bad thing, although
each new regulation invariably presents some additional compliance
costs for the regulated industry. Offsetting the increased compliance
costs are the reductions in uncertainty in the regulated market. Reduced
uncertainty fosters investment and can bolster share prices, even if net
revenues are lower due to greater compliance costs. This was the thrust
of Entergy Corp.'s argument in its amicus brief.70 Breaking ranks with
the rest of the regulated industry, Entergy argued that the lingering
uncertainty about future regulations and liability, which could be sudden
and drastic if the EPA does nothing until there is some climate-related
catastrophe, seemed more burdensome to the business than complying
with whatever regulations the EPA is likely to promulgate if it starts
now. 71  In addition, new regulations can act as a restraint on an
enforcement agency, in that it sets predictable limits within which the
agency must conduct its enforcement.72 Rulemaking diverts some
agency resources to the process of proposing and implementing the rules.
These resources might otherwise have gone toward monitoring and
enforcement of previous regulations that also burden the relevant
industry.
70. See Brief for Entergy Corp., supra note 12, at *34.
71. See id. at *3:
The energy needs of the United States are expected to double over the next 50
years, and Entergy and its fellow industry members need to plan-and act-
now for the strategic capital investments-viewed on a 25-year horizon-that
will be necessary to meet this increased demand. Entergy seeks certainty with
respect to the regulatory regime it must operate under, and does not believe that
EPA's current position on C02 regulation will stand the test of time.
72. See id. (Entergy expressed grave concern about the prospect of being subject to
some type of post-Kyoto international regime that would provide few procedural
safeguards and protections for individual parties.) Again, this seems remarkably
insightful and prescient for a member of the regulated industry-to look past immediate
compliance costs and see that things could be worse in the absence of American legal
restraints and safeguards. See id. at *4.
Finally, Entergy is far less sanguine than EPA about the prospect of this
nation's air-quality decisions being decided by the international community.
Entergy prefers the considerable safeguards of the CAA rulemaking process,
which provides for participation by interested parties sensitive to this nation's
needs and fosters (through judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act) decisions grounded in sound scientific debate. The international debate
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Finally, the potential for overlapping jurisdiction and regulations
can dilute the impact of each agency's actions. For example, in the
present case, the Court mentions the overlap with the Department of
Transportation's rules about automobile efficiency. The EPA argued that
this would make their prospective regulations somewhat redundant. This
redundancy, however, should allay some of the fears of the regulated
industry because it softens the real-world impact of what the agency can
do.
This essay explores these points further. Part II will briefly
summarize the arguments raised about "special solicitude" for state
standing by the Court's majority and by Roberts' dissent and will attempt
to situate this new rule in its historical context, looking for the origin of
the "special solicitude" phraseology in earlier decisions of the Court.
The heart of this article, however, is in Part III, which will focus mostly
on the implications of the special solicitude rule for each state's Attorney
General, as well as the indirect effects on special-interest activist groups
like the NRDC. Also included will be some speculation about ways
future courts may narrow or distinguish the special solicitude rule of
Massachusetts v. EPA. Part IV turns to the subject of compelled
rulemaking for federal agencies, again summarizing the majority and
dissenting opinions on this issue, and highlighting the distinction
between rulemaking and enforcement in this regard. Part IV also
explores some of the likely consequences if compelled regulation
becomes more commonplace. Part V offers a brief summary and
concluding remarks.
Before proceeding, it seems appropriate to offer some disclaimers
and disclosures. While this article does respond primarily to one new
decision by the Supreme Court, it is not a "case note" in the traditional
sense. I do not advocate a position about the merits of the Court's
holding or rationale, or offer normative prescriptions for how future
courts should apply the case. More importantly, this article does not take
a strong position on the controversy surrounding global warming or
whether the EPA should regulate greenhouse gases. The numerous,
well-written briefs in the case exhaustively present the best arguments on
each side of the issues, supplemented by insightful comments from both
the majority and the dissenters in Massachusetts v. EPA, and the
carefully crafted opinions of the lower court. To reiterate the policy
arguments pertaining to climate change would seem unnecessarily
redundant. Rather, the approach taken here, as in my other writings,
focuses on the etiological aspects of law, the point where law translates
into actual decisions or choices by the affected citizens, state actors, and
judges. Readers committed to an ontological or normative approach to
legal academics may find this approach bothersome, but the discussion
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of consequences resulting from the Court's decision should provide
useful information even for readers whose primary goal is to stake out a
position. Etiological considerations overlap partially with utilitarianism,
so the discussion that follows may suggest a utilitarian bent. The
purpose here is not to say whether the outcome of the case was correct,
or if the dissenters "should have won" instead, but rather to look at what
prompted the Court to craft the new rule contained in the case and what
repercussions might follow, whether directly or indirectly.
II. Special Solicitude for States: Background
One of the pivotal lines in the Court's opinion in Massachusetts v.
EPA is the sentence where it pronounces a new rule for state standing to
sue federal agencies: "Given that procedural right73 and Massachusetts'
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is
entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis."74 Chief Justice
Roberts decries this innovation in his dissent, stating flatly that
"[r]elaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries are
pressed by a State, however, has no basis in our jurisprudence, and
support for any such 'special solicitude' is conspicuously absent from the
Court's opinion. 75
Roberts is mostly right about the Court's opinion. The majority
bases its stance on the states' dependence on the federal government to
protect them from out-of-state nuisances,76 Congress' mandate to the
agency to protect the welfare of the states,77 and the statutory provision
for citizen suits against the EPA.78 Its citations to previous legal
authority are quite thin. The majority and dissent tussle over the
applicability of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 79 which seems to
pertain to a different problem or element of state standing than the one in
Massachusetts v. EPA, and over a number of cases cited by the dissent
about the federal government's freedom to impose itself upon the states
in certain matters. 80 The majority mentions one relatively recent case,
73. That is, the general statutory right for citizen suits under the Clean Air Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 752 1(b)(1) (2000).
74. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 1464.
76. Id. at 1454.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); see also Massachusetts
v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55, 1464-65.
80. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n. 17 and 1464-66 (citing
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) and Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982)).
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Nebraska v. Wyoming, 81 for the proposition that states have standing to
bring cross-claims against the federal government to vindicate "'quasi-
sovereign' interests which are 'independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain[.'
82
The cases that each side discusses, however, do not mention the
phrase "special solicitude" at all. The phrase is likely to become
shorthand for the new rule for standing this case creates (or at least
clarifies). The question remains, therefore, where the Court found this
particular verbiage. This section explores the historical origin of the
phrase itself.
Professor Peter Tiersma has recently proposed that the increasing
textualization of case law or precedents in the American legal system
gives priority to specific phrases and verbiage that subsequent courts
(and lawyers) quote constantly. 83 "American judges seem to be looking
for 'sound bites' that encapsulate some or all of the holding of a case,"
he observes. 84  "Judges ... seem increasingly happy to provide those
judicial sound bites. ' 85 One such "sound bite" is the incantation "special
solicitude," which functions as an invitation for states to seek redress in
the courts against recalcitrant federal agencies. Textualization of
precedents in the American legal system has reached a level where it is
meaningful and informative to trace the etymological lineage of a special
phrase that becomes shorthand for a new legal rule.
A. Case-Based Etymology
The phrase "special solicitude" is relatively common in American
jurisprudence, and it appears relatively frequently in Supreme Court
decisions. Even so, never before Massachusetts v. EPA has the Court
used this jargon for state standing. Apart from questions of standing or
of states' rights, the Court has mentioned its "special solicitude" for
86 8veterans, sailors, 87 the disabled,8 8 pro se litigants,89 the protection of
81. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1 (1995).
82. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17 (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S.
at 237) (emphasis in original).
83. See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1187, 1257-1262 (2007).
84. Id. at 1260.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Spicer v. Smith, 288 U.S. 430, 435 (1933) (While declining to find that
pension payments under the World War Veterans' Act were entitled to a priority against a
bank's insolvency, the Court says that "war risk" pension laws "evince special solicitude
for the protection of veterans who by reason of mental incompetency are unable to
protect themselves."); People ex rel. Nelson v. Stony Island State Sav. Bank, 192 N.E.
682, 684 (Ill. 1934) ("special solicitude for the protection of veterans who by reason of
mental incompetency are unable to protect themselves"); In re Bagnall's Guardianship,
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29 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Iowa 1947) (Veterans' pension laws like many to be found in
pension laws, "disclose a purpose to safeguard to beneficiaries the appropriations and
payments made for their benefit... and evince special solicitude for the protection of
veterans who by reason of mental incompetency are unable to protect themselves.");
Reichert v. Berlin State Bank of Marne, Mich., 251 N.W. 340, 341 (Mich. 1933)
(Veterans' pension laws like many to be found in pension laws, "disclose a purpose to
safeguard to beneficiaries the appropriations and payments made for their benefit ... and
evince special solicitude for the protection of veterans who by reason of mental
incompetency are unable to protect themselves."); Sharkey v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct.
643, 649 (Cl. Ct. 1989) ("The United States Government, in view of the tenuous basis of
the legality of the conflict in Vietnam, undertook a special solicitude toward those
involved in the Vietnam conflict and created a fiduciary obligation toward such
servicepersons therein involved[.]").
87. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (holding that there
is a cause of action for wrongful death of a seaman under general maritime law, the Court
noted that "admiralty courts have always shown a special solicitude for the welfare of
seamen and their families"); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 626-27
(1978) (noting that maritime law has "always shown 'a special solicitude for the welfare
of those men who [undertake] to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea
voyages"') (citation omitted); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 386-
87 (1970) (holding that a cause of action exists under maritime law for death caused by a
violation of maritime duty, based in part on the principle of affording seamen special
solicitude, which differs from the common law).
88. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 1987)
("The special solicitude shown by Congress for the blind has been so long, so constant,
and so pointed that it must be seen as manifesting a congressional conviction that the
federal government has, in the words of yet another statute, 'special federal
responsibilities' to the blind."); Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726
F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The mentally retarded may well be a paradigmatic
example of a discrete and insular minority for whom the judiciary should exercise special
solicitude[,]" in part because they lack power in the political process and their condition
is "immutable") (citation omitted).
89. See, e.g., Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006)
(according "special solicitude" to a pro se litigant's submissions to the Court to interpret
them as stating the "strongest arguments that they suggest."); Girard v. Donald W. Wyatt
Det. Facility Inc., 50 Fed. Appx. 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the court affords special
solicitude to pro se litigants, but it does not forgive disregard of procedural rules);
Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Recognizing that the Ruotolos were acting
pro se, the district court should have afforded them special solicitude before granting the
IRS's motion for summary judgment."); Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1994) (discussing the "prison mailbox rule" which affords incarcerated pro se
litigants special solicitude by deeming a motion "filed" upon placing it in the prison
mailbox, rather than upon receipt by the court clerk); Trammell v. Coombe, No. 97-2622,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34073, at *5 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1999) ("It is well settled that the
courts afford pro se litigants 'special solicitude' when they are faced with motions for
summary judgment. The failure of a district court to apprise pro se litigants of the
consequences of failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily
grounds for reversal.") (citations omitted); Coronado v. LeFevre, No. 98-2792, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8213, at *6 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1999) ("Keeping in mind both our requirement
that dismissal for failure to prosecute be used in only 'extreme' cases and the special
solicitude courts should extend to pro se plaintiffs in this area, we conclude that the
dismissal of Coronado's case was error."); Int'l Bus. Prop. v. ITT Sheraton Corp., No.
94-55427, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24542, at *8 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1995) (affirming trial
court's dismissal of pro se plaintiff's suit because of discovery sanctions, this court notes
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certain civil liberties,90 and ironically, plaintiffs injured by a regulatory
change by an administrative agency, as opposed to a refusal to regulate
in the first place. 91 The first five of these categories comprise the vast
majority of reported cases where the phrase occurs.
As for the issue of states' rights or standing, it seems the immediate
precedent for the phrase, ironically, comes from the dissenting opinion in
a previous case, United States v. Morrison,92 where Justices Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer (all in the majority in Massachusetts v.
EPA) criticized their more "federalist" colleagues on the majority for
going overboard on the states' behalf. 93  Justice Souter complained
disparagingly: "The majority's special solicitude for 'areas of traditional
state regulation' . . . is thus founded not on the text of the Constitution
but on what has been termed the 'spirit of the Tenth Amendment."' 94 In
Morrison, the Court (which included only one of the Justices, Kennedy,
who subsequently joined the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA) held that
the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act 95 was
unconstitutional, due in part to the reservation of unenumerated rights to
the states under the Tenth Amendment. 96  The case did not concern
standing, but rather the constitutionality of giving private parties (victims
"[w]e recognize that pro se litigants are granted special solicitude with regard to court-
ordered sanctions"); Adams v. Nankervis, No. 89-35511, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7653, at
*4 (9th Cir. May 10, 1990) ("We recognize that pro se litigants, especially prisoners,
must be given special solicitude."). But see Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 28 (1st
Cir. 2001) (pro se litigant is denied special solicitude because he is, himself, a lawyer).
90. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331, 1333 (1978) ("[T]his
Court has shown a special solicitude for applicants who seek stays of actions threatening
a significant impairment of First Amendment interests."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 734 (1972) (Stewart, P., dissenting) ("[W]e have shown a special solicitude towards
the 'indispensable liberties' protected by the First Amendment.") (citations omitted);
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972) (noting that although "the courts
properly have shown a special solicitude for the guarantees of the First Amendment, this
Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of
free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private
purposes only"); Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 856 n.10 (Pa. 1974) ("The
Supreme Court of the United States has regularly shown a special solicitude for interests
touching on the defense of criminal cases and imprisonment.") (citations omitted);
Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1307 (1974) ("The Court
also has shown a special solicitude for preserving fairness in a criminal trial.").
91. See Vigil v. Rhoades. 746 F.Supp. 1471, 1482 (D.N.M. 1990) ("Finally, this
Court's conclusion ... is bolstered by the special solicitude the Supreme Court has
prescribed in those situations in which an agency decision amounts to a change of course:
Revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different than a failure to act.")
(emphasis in original).
92. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
93. See id. at 649 n.18.
94. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
96. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
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of gender-based violence) a federal civil remedy against state actors.97
As this is the most recent case 98 prior to Massachusetts v. EPA
where members of the Court used the phrase to refer to judicial deference
to states' rights, it seems that the irony may have been intentional.
Perhaps the majority, which (minus Justice Kennedy) had comprised the
dissenters in Morrison, wanted to highlight the inconsistency of the self-
proclaimed advocates of states' rights (such as Scalia and Thomas) in
flipping on the federalism issue once it concerned an environmental
problem instead. The alternative is that the real inconsistency is on the
part of the Massachusetts v. EPA majority, which criticized the idea of
giving "special solicitude" to states in the earlier decision. It is possible
that the five Justices were incognizant of the Court's most recent use of
the phrase, but this seems unlikely given its relative uncommonness in
this setting and the fact that they themselves were the ones who last used
it. 99 More plausibly, the majority intended it as a subtle jab at the
dissenters.
Supporting the theory that "special solicitude" was a loaded term or
jab is the fact that the next antecedent case before Morrison to employ
the phrase was Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 1 00 where Justice Scalia
penned a characteristically scathing dissent against the Court's
endorsement of a Florida redistricting arrangement that a federal judge
had mandated. He contended that "one would think that the special
97. Prior to Massachusetts v. EPA, academic commentators had observed "special
solicitude" by the Rehnquist Court (the commentators' words, not the Court's) in areas
other than standing to sue. See, e.g., Preeta D. Bansal, The Supreme Court's Federalism
Revival and Reinvigorating the "Federalism Deal, " 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
447, 450 (2007).
The Supreme Court's federalism revival was marked by heightened solicitude
to states in four areas of constitutional doctrine: Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause, Congress's powers to enact legislation pursuant to Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, and "reserved" powers under the Tenth Amendment.
ld.
98. This section focuses on court precedents as a way of exploring case-based
etymology for technical legal terminology (i.e., "special solicitude for states"). There is
widespread use of the phrase in the legal academic literature, especially after Morrison
(literally hundreds of passing references, but mostly incidental to quotes from the dissent
in Morrison, or citations to one journal article from 2001 that used the phrase in its title.
Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude For States Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 81 (2001)). To the extent that the "source" for Justice Stevens' use of the
phrase in Massachusetts v. EPA may lie in academic commentary rather than the Court's
own opinions, the most likely culprit would be the "2006 Fordham Law Review
Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens," in which contributing panelist-
writers used the phrase repeatedly. See infra Section 1.B for more discussion.
99. As mentioned above, the phrase is reasonably commonplace in contexts far
removed from states' rights or standing, but noticeably rare in this situation.
100. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
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solicitude we have shown for preservation of the States' apportionment
authority would cause the court to demand clearer credentials on the part
of those who purport to speak for the legislature.' ' °1  He ends this
sentence with a footnote10 2 that is particularly relevant to the standing
issue in Massachusetts v. EPA:
The Court is of the view that participation by Florida's legislative
branches was beside the point, and that the attorney general alone
could propose a redistricting plan and settle this lawsuit without
participation by the legislature.... I know of no support for this
proposition, and the Court provides none.03
The phrase "special solicitude," therefore, had appeared in reference
to states' rights even before Morrison, and may have furnished the idea
for the other justices (in the majority in Lawyer) to use it to characterize
and criticize the states'-rights position in the subsequent Morrison case.
It is also interesting that Justice Scalia used the phrase "special
solicitude" in a sentence where he then contrasted the "will of the state"
with that of its Attorney General. 10 4 The majority, in a statement that
seems to have foreshadowed Massachusetts v. EPA, described the AG's
special role in the litigation: "[T]here is no reason to suppose that the
State's attorney general lacked authority to propose a plan as an incident
of his authority to represent the State in the litigation.' ' 05 In response to
Scalia's statement excerpted above, the majority added in a footnote,
"We disagree on this question of state law only insofar as the dissent
views this implicit authority to limit the broad discretion possessed by
the attorney general of Florida in representing the State in litigation."',
0 6
Going back further in the Court's history, the next case107 before
101. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 587 n.3 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
104. See id. at 586.
105. Id. at 577. It is important to note, however, that the Florida State Constitution
explicitly provided for the Attorney General to have this role in reapportionment or
redistricting litigation: "Within fifteen days after the passage of the joint resolution of
apportionment, the attorney general shall petition the supreme court of the state for a
declaratory judgment determining the validity of the apportionment." FLA. CONST. art.
III, § 16(c) (1970).
106. Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. at 578 n. 4 (citation omitted).
107. There is one intervening case where the Court mentioned Congress'
"considerable solicitude for state law" in the "savings" provisions of the Federal Railroad
Safety Act. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 665 (1993) (Justice White
wrote this part of the opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court). I have relegated this
instance to a footnote because it is not a case where the Court is talking about
"solicitude" as a principle of jurisprudence or as a factor federal judges should consider,
but rather makes a passing comment on Congress' explicit legislative decision to eschew
preemption in certain delineated circumstances.
(Vol. 112:1
SPECIAL SOLICITUDE FOR STATE STANDING
Lawyer that employed the "special solicitude" phrase for states was
seventeen years earlier. Andrus v. Utah'0 8 addressed the Secretary of
Interior's authority (and full discretion) to refuse state applications to
trade federal grazing land for school-grant land, designated as such as
part of the state's entry into the Union. 0 9 The key phrase again appears
as a slogan for dissenters, as Justice Powell complained that the relevant
statute (the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934)110 had shown "special solicitude
for the States by directing the Secretary [of the Interior] to ... cooperate
fully with the State to that end."'11
An even earlier case that also mentions the phrase in a dissenting
opinion seems more relevant to the reasoning of the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,"2 the
Court gave standing to foreign governments (India et al.) to sue
American companies under domestic antitrust laws and seek treble
damages. 13 The Court relied in part on previous decisions allowing state
governments to sue as the victims of antitrust violations. 14  Justice
Powell argued that there was no reason to extend the same "solicitude" to
foreign nations that Congress had given to the states, at least under the
Court's interpretations.' "The solicitude that we assume Congress has
for the welfare of each of the United States, especially when the subject
matter of legislation largely has been removed from the competence of
the States and has been entrusted to the United States, cannot be assumed
with respect to foreign nations."' 16 Justice Stevens uses this same point
as one of his three reasons for the new "special solicitude" rule for
standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, that is, that the states have voluntarily
forfeited their right to legislate in certain areas when they joined the
Union and therefore depend on the federal agencies for protection.
Stevens did not cite the Pfizer decision, of course, but it seems that one
could cite it for this general idea. Justice Roberts is therefore only partly
correct in his assertion that the Court's move was unprecedented. Pfizer,
and the cases it cites, do pertain to standing for government entities, but
not standing under Article III; the question is whether they are
108. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500 (1980).
109. See id.
110. 43U.S.C§315etseq.(1980).
11. See Andrus, 446 U.S. at 531 (Powell, J. dissenting). Interestingly, Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion in this case, as he did in Massachusetts v. EPA. He is
the only Justice who was on the Court for both cases.
112. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
113. See id. at 320. More precisely, the Court held that held that foreign nations, if
otherwise entitled to sue in American courts, would also be entitled to sue for treble
damages under the antitrust laws, at least to the same extent as any other plaintiff. See id.
114. See, e.g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
115. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 331 (Powell, J. dissenting).
116. Id.
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appropriate plaintiffs under a particular statute.
Twelve years before Pfizer, the Court, in United States v. Yazell,
l 7
mentioned a principle or rule of "solicitude" for states in the context of
federal preemption. The litigation in this case was essentially a debt
collection action by a federal agency against the wife of a bankrupt
borrower in rural Texas and the decision appears to be partially result-
driven.' 18 It is an interesting case because the relevant state law, the rule
of "coverture," (making married women immune to contract liability)
was no longer in force by the time the case reached the Supreme
Court." 9  Siding with Ms. Yazell, the Court (through Justice Fortas)
distinguished this case from other types of preemption cases, and
explained that the federal agency was bound by the laws of the state at
the time it entered the contract to make a disaster-relief loan to the
defendant:
We do not here consider the question of the constitutional power of
the Congress to override state law in these circumstances by direct
legislation or by appropriate authorization to an administrative
agency coupled with suitable implementing action by the agency.
We decide only that this Court, in the absence of specific
congressional action, should not decree in this situation that
implementation of federal interests requires overriding the particular
state rule involved here. Both theory and the precedents of this Court
teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of
family and family-property arrangements. 1
20
Despite his careful choice of words, Fortas cites none of the
"precedents of this Court" for the rule of "solicitude for state interests";
his footnotes for the distinguished types of preemption cases are to
precedents where the Court sided with the federal government. This is
not a case about standing, of course, which distinguishes it from
Massachusetts v. EPA on a fundamental level. Nevertheless, it does
stand for the abstract proposition of deferring to the will of the states in
areas where there is a gap in federal regulations and legislation, as there
was in this case, even if the states' interest runs counter to the stated
policy of a federal agency. In that sense, Yazell does foreshadow
Massachusetts v. EPA.'
2'
117. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
118. See id. at 342-45.
119. See id. at 343.
120. Id. at 352 (internal citations omitted).
121. For other cases where a court includes the "solicitude" phrase in a quote from
Yazell, see Sitton v. United States, 413 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir 1969) and Novak v.
Gen. Elec. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (both standing for the
principle that federal courts should avoid fashioning a "federal rule" to fill a gap in
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Justice Fortas' allusion to Supreme Court "precedents" for his rule
is particularly significant because there are none in the 130 years
preceding his words. This might explain his otherwise strange omission
of citations. Prior to Yazell, there is a period of several generations
without a single instance where the Supreme Court uses the phrase (or
anything like it) to refer to federal judicial deference to states.1
22
Similarly, there are no federal circuit court cases prior to Yazell that use
this phrase in relation to states' prerogatives, standing, or rights.
The only previous federal decision to mention "special solicitude"
for states, albeit pertaining to federal court jurisdiction instead of
standing, is Briggs v. French, 23 an 1835 case that addressed a dispute
over land title between private parties in different states. 24 The passing
nature of the reference, and the inapposite issue that confronted the Court
in that case, seem to put it outside the etymological lineage of the
"special solicitude" rule in Massachusetts v. EPA.
B. Commentary-Based Etymology
The previous section focused on Court precedents as a way of
exploring case-based etymology for the specific verbiage or technical
jargon in question (i.e., "special solicitude for states"). It is possible, of
course, that academic commentators' use of the phrase could have
influenced Justice Stevens' word choice, even though he mentions none.
For what it may be worth, academic commentators used the phrase
only twice in the years preceding Yazell, 125 and only four times in the
twelve years between Yazell and Pfizer, ' 26 but nowhere in the context of
federal legislation or regulation where there is an applicable state rule operating in the
case).
122. There is also a passing reference to "solicitude" for "freedom of trade among the
states" in Justice Black's dissent in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
549-50 (1949) (Black, J. dissenting) (case concerning state denial of license for milk
processing plant owned by out-of-state corporation; the majority held that it violated the
commerce clause).
123. See Briggs v. French, 4 F. Cas. 117 (1835).
124. Seeid. at 119.
125. See Note, Property Subject to the Federal Tax Lien, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1485,
1490 (1964) ("The Meyer opinion is thus noteworthy for its demonstration of solicitude
toward state exemption policy and its willingness to draw federal policy therefrom even
at the risk of sacrificing uniformity in tax collection procedures.") (citation omitted);
Note, The Supreme Court: 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 152 (1959) ("Against the
application of federal substantive law in Tungus, Mr. Justice Stewart argued that
Congress, in enacting the Death on the High Seas Act, had exhibited a solicitude for the
preservation of state law in this area.") (discussing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S.
588 (1959), which does not use the term "solicitude").
126. See Note, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1610
(1978) ("In recent years, the Court has evinced increasing solicitude for an independent
sphere of state responsibility."); Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
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standing for states to bring suit. In the years since Morrison, however,
there have been literally hundreds of passing references. Most of these
are incidental to quotes from the dissent in Morrison'27 or the other cases
discussed in the previous section. There are also numerous footnote
citations to one journal article from 2001, which used the phrase in its
title. 28  If the "source" for Justice Stevens' use of the phrase in
Massachusetts were academic commentary rather than the Court's own
opinions, the most likely culprit would be the "2006 Fordham Law
Review Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens," in which
contributing panelist-writers used the phrase repeatedly,129 and with
which Justice Stevens would presumably have been familiar.
Of the innumerable articles that discuss the Court's "special
solicitude" for states, it appears that none use the phrase in connection
with standing for states as plaintiffs. Instead, most discuss state
sovereignty issues, that is, state immunity to lawsuits, 30 or freedom from
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1977) ("the decisions of the Supreme Court
have evidenced increasing solicitude for the interests and prerogatives of the states");
Note, The Supreme Court: 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1976) (mentioning
"the Court's increasing solicitude for the role of states in a federal system," based on its
previous term decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976));
Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1871 (1976) (examining "the trend toward increasing solicitude for state interests
which culminated in the [1976 Supreme Court] Usery decision."). There is also one from
1979: Comment, Federal Interference with Checks and Balances in State Government: A
Constitutional Limit on the Spending Power, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 402, 416-18 (1979)
(discussing the lack of "special solicitude" for states in the Court's analysis of federal
block grant spending by state governors).
127. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist
Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1354 (2006) (quoting United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
128. See Caminker, supra note 98.
129. See Thomas H. Lee, Countermajoritarian Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2123, 2129 (2006) ("Justice Stevens's special solicitude for the state (and federal) judges
in the trenches is also evident in his oft-professed enthusiasm for percolation of federal
issues among state supreme courts and federal circuit courts before the Supreme Court
grants certiorari."); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2134-35 (2006) ("The much-noted tension
between the Rehnquist Court's professed solicitude for states in its Commerce Clause and
Tenth and Eleventh Amendment cases and its constriction of state authority in its
preemption cases provides onc illustration of the normative difficulties."); David J.
Barron, Fighting Federalism With Federalism: If It's Not Just A Battle Between
Federalists And Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2117 (2006)
(But taken as a whole, it does not seem controversial to assert that the body of
work produced by the Federalism Five has a clearly conservative cast while the
Dissenting Four's does not. That is particularly true when one compares the
areas in which the Federalism Five's usual solicitude for state decision making
gives way with the areas in which the Dissenting Four's usual embrace of
federal power weakens.).
130. See Caminker, supra note 98 (discussing solicitude for states' "dignity" as a
rationale for overturning federal rights of action against states, that is, tort liability for
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federal statutory preemption or federal review of state laws or actions.' 31
In a sense, these issues represent the mirror image of the standing issue
in Massachusetts v. EPA, which implicated the immunity of the federal
government against suits by states, and, more importantly, the rights of
states to interfere with federal regulation under certain circumstances.
As with the line of cases using the phrase "special solicitude" pertaining
to states' rights, the usage by academic commentators also completely
omits the issue of standing. Perhaps the widespread use of the phrase in
academic commentary influenced the terminology chosen by Justice
Stevens, as a verbal allusion or echo, but his application of the phrase is
conceptually distinct from its use in scholarly publications.
C. Oral Arguments and Briefs
The previous sections focused on the technical terminology adopted
by the Court for its new standing rule-"special solicitude"-and
explored its origin. The most likely candidate is the Morrison dissent,
but in no case was this phrase used for state standing to sue. The
remaining question, therefore, is the origin of the idea that the Court
decided to associate with this phrase in Massachusetts v. EPA.
state governments under federal law); Richard H. Seamon, Damages For
Unconstitutional Affirmative Action: An Analysis Of The Monetary Claims In Hopwood
v. Texas, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 885 (1998) (discussing a hierarchy of federal solicitude,
first for the states, second for state officials, and least for private parties).
131. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Federalism Past, Federalism Future: A Constitutional
Law Symposium: Active Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 541 (2007);
Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist's Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV.
612, 662 (2006) ("[t]n general the Justices of the federalism majority cited narrow
language in Marshall Court decisions that suggest solicitude for state autonomy.
Conversely, the dissenters cited the more nationalistic implications of Gibbons and other
Marshall Court decisions."); See Hollis, supra note 127, at 1354 (quoting Morrison);
Michael S. Greve and Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 57 (2006) ("In particular, and perhaps
contrary to perceptions of the Court's increased solicitude for 'states' rights,' the
Rehnquist Court does not appear to have become more hostile to federal preemption, at
least not by a measure of case outcomes.") (emphasis in original); Margaret H. Lemos,
The Commerce Power And Criminal Punishment: Presumption Of Constitutionality Or
Presumption Of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1251 (2006) ("In the rare instances in
which states oppose new federal enactments or desire a repeal of existing prohibitions,
any solicitude for the states likely will be overcome by federal legislators' own powerful
incentives to take a tough-on-crime stance."); Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The
Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(discussing the need for more solicitude of state court procedures); Michael W.
McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 (1997) ("The opinion
was unsurprising in its treatment of the federalism issue, following the recent trend
toward significantly greater solicitude for the autonomy and authority of the states in the
federal system.").
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There was a passing discussion at oral argument about the notion
that states should have automatic or "special" standing, at least when
there is an issue of federal preemption preventing states from regulating
themselves.132 Justice Kennedy first brought it up:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. I'm asking whether you have some
special standing-
MR. MILKEY: Yes-
JUSTICE KENNEDY: -as a State and, if so, what's the authority
for that? 133
This seems to be the origin of the phrase "special standing," at least
for states, because it does not occur in the briefs. Seizing the thought,
Mr. Milkey tried to point the Court to West Virginia v. EPA,134 where the
D.C. Circuit apparently granted standing on this basis:
MR. MILKEY: Your Honor, first of all, I do think we have special
standing. For example, here it's uncontested that greenhouse gases
are going to make ozone problems worse, which makes it harder for
us to comply with our existing Clean Air Act responsibilities.
And the-in the West Virginia case, which is a D.C. Circuit case, the
Court found that that itself provided an independent source of
standing. In terms of Supreme Court cases, the-it's been-for 200
years, this Court has recognized loss of state sovereign property as a
traditional-
1 35
The conversation then shifted to a discussion of the Massachusetts
coastline, and then Justice Scalia's concern that this would be another
S. C.R.A.p.136 case, with little useful precedential value. Justice Ginsburg
then interrupted this discussion, interjecting a request for clarification
about the special standing:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Milkey, does it make a difference that
you're not representing a group of law students, but a number of
States who are claiming that they are disarmed from regulating and
that the regulatory responsibility has been given to the Federal
132. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3431932 (Nov. 29, 2006).
133. Id. at*14.
134. See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
135. Transcript of Oral Argument at *14-15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(No. 05-1120).
136. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973).
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Government and the Federal Government isn't exercising it? I
thought you had a discrete claim based on the sovereignty of States
and their inability to regulate dependent on the law Congress passed
that gives that authority to the EPA. I thought that was-
MR. MILKEY: Your Honor, you are correct that we are saying that
provides us also an independent source of our standing.
37
Milkey's statement seems explicit enough. Justice Scalia then stated the
issue nicely:
JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand that. You have standing
whenever a Federal law preempts state action? You can complain
about the implementation of that law because it has preempted your
state action? Is that the basis of standing you're alleging?
MR. MILKEY: In short, Your Honor-
JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you know any case that has ever held that?
MR. MILKEY: Your Honor, I would cite you to the amicus brief of
the State of Arizona et al., which cites several cases, albeit not in this
Court, that stand for that principle.
3 8
Then the discussion turned back to the Clean Air Act itself.3 9 The
point did not resurface during oral argument. The West Virginia v. EPA
case, mentioned at oral argument, is interesting because it came from the
same court that ruled against the petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA. '40
Neither the majority nor the dissenters cite the case in Massachusetts v.
EPA, even though it would appear to be highly relevant. In the West
Virginia v. EPA case, two states and several business and energy policy
entities petitioned for review of EPA requirements compelling states to
revise state implementation plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act, so as
to reduce nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. 141 The rules (which followed
protracted litigation already 42) established emission limits for major
NOx sources. 143 The EPA contended that West Virginia and Illinois
137. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *16-17, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (No. 05-1120).
138. Id. at *17.
139. See id.
140. See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
141. Id. at 864-65.
142. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Appalachian
"); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Appalachian If').
143. West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 864-65.
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lacked standing to challenge its regulatory action.' The court
disagreed, holding that the states should have standing because of the
way that the regulatory framework effectively tied their hands:
Here, the states are suing as states. The NOx SIP Call directs each
state to revise its SIP in accordance with EPA's NOx emissions
budget for the state. The lower the emissions budget, the more
difficult and onerous is the states' task of devising an adequate SIP.
Thus, lower growth factors leading to lower emissions budgets causes
injury to the states as states. EPA's own brief belies its argument, as
it states that "under the NOx SIP Call, states have the option of
participating in [a] cap and trade program or obtaining the reductions
through other mechanisms." This injury is sufficient to confer
standing. 1
45
The case is distinguishable from Massachusetts v. EPA on several
grounds: this involves proactive command-and-control regulation by the
EPA, rather than a refusal to regulate; and the harm here is not from
increased pollution, but from the unfair, disproportionate compliance
burden placed on certain states instead of others. Even so, one could
argue, as Attorney General Milkey did, that the case involves a federal
regulatory encroachment on state sovereignty, albeit a permissible
encroachment, but that this impingement of the state's right to make laws
automatically creates a harm sufficient to generate standing. The D.C.
Circuit Court cites no authority for this position except City of Olmstead
Falls v. FAA, 46 which was a case about a proposed airport runway
creating actual physical harm to the neighboring community, not about a
local government being unable to regulate freely within its own
jurisdiction.
147
The "Arizona Brief' mentioned during the oral arguments 14 8 in
Massachusetts v. EPA does focus on standing, but devotes almost all of
its pages to the traditional elements (namely injury in fact and
redressibility). Only on the last pages does it mention, almost in passing,
the possibility that states should have standing whenever they have a
144. See id. at 868.
145. Id
146. See City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
147. See id. at 268.
Olmsted Falls may bring this petition if it alleges harm to itself as city qua city.
Taking a generous reading of the petitioner's materials, we find that Olmsted
Falls has alleged harm to its own economic interests based on the
environmental impacts of the approved project. Although it is a close question,
we conclude that the City has standing to bring this action.
Id.
148. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *17, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3431932 (Nov. 29, 2006).
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colorable claim of preemption. 149 It seems almost to be an afterthought,
and it would not have received mention at oral arguments unless Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg had specifically asked for cases on this specific
point. The "Arizona Brief," in turn, mentions four circuit court cases
that seem to stand for the proposition that states have standing based on
any infringement of state sovereignty.
150
The first case mentioned' 51 is an older case, Florida v.
Weinberger.152  In this case, the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare had regulated "what sort
of a state licensing board for nursing home administrators will qualify for
the Medicaid program."'153 Florida challenged the regulation, disputing
the Department's statutory authority to pass such regulations 54 and
complaining that the regulations would preempt Florida's own internal
regulation of its nursing home administrators. 155 The Fifth Circuit held:
It seems clear that, considerations of ripeness and sovereign
immunity aside, the State of Florida has standing, arising from its
clear interest both in the manner in which the Medicaid program is
administered vis-a-vis its citizens and in being spared the
reconstitution of its statutory program, to litigate the merits of this
case.... We hold that Florida has standing.
56
It is interesting, however, that unlike the discussion during the oral
arguments in Massachusetts v. EPA (and in the majority opinion itself),
this case explicitly finds state standing apart from "sovereignty
immunity" concerns. 57 Nevertheless, the bases the court uses instead,
concern for its citizens' welfare and preemption of its own state statutes,
149. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin,
As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *22-23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380.
150. Id. at*21.
151. See id. at *22.
152. See Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974).
153. Id. at 490.
154. See id. at 491.
155. See id. at 490-91.
156. Id. at 494.
157. Id. Admittedly, it is rather unclear whether the court is talking about Florida's
sovereign immunity or the federal government's. In the immediate context, the court is
discussing Florida's standing and whether it has a redressible injury, but the closing line
of the opinion uses the phrase apparently in reference to an argument that the federal
agency raised instead.
The Secretary perfunctorily advances sovereign immunity. To this contention a
sufficient answer is that the complaint contains the classic allegations of action
beyond the minister's delegated powers and that these, should plaintiffs prevail
on the merits, must perforce be established since his regulations are challenged
on no other ground.
Id. at 496.
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seem to be the very items included in the notion of "sovereignty" thirty-
three years later in Massachusetts v. EPA. The Weinberger case may
also be distinguishable because its vintage made it excessively dependent
on the then-recent United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures [SCRAP] case, 5 8 which the Supreme Court now
treats as largely discredited.1
59
The second case discussed in the Arizona Brief160 was a more recent
case, Alaska v. United States Department of Transportation,'6 1 in which
twenty-seven states challenged orders of the Department of
Transportation (DOT) concerning advertising by airlines.' 62 The states
claimed that the federal agency had failed to follow the rigors of notice-
and-comment procedures required by the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). 163 The DOT disputed the states' standing to challenge its action,
claiming there was no cognizable injury. The states based their "injury"
on the prospective preemption that would occur, an encroachment
(admittedly legal if done according to the APA's strictures) on state
sovereignty, 164 which is closer to the concepts raised in Massachusetts v.
EPA. Interestingly, in this case the federal agency contended that the
state Attorneys General were mistaken about the preemption, arguing
that the relevant state statutes were such that they would skirt
preemption. 165 The court seemed irritated by this argument, stating: "In
effect, DOT asks us to dismiss the States' claims on jurisdictional
grounds because of some speculative possibility that the various
Attorneys General do not understand state law. This we emphatically
decline to do."'16 6 It is interesting to see this early hint of deference to
state AG's in determining preemption questions, over the objections of
the federal agency, as furnishing the basis for standing. Even so, the
Supreme Court did not cite Alaska v. U.S. Department of Transportation
in the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion.
158. See id. at 494-96 (Even the court in Weinberger expressed skepticism about
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures [SCRAP], 412 U.S.
669 (1973).). "If these be thought gossamer distinctions, we can only rejoin that
SCRAP's ingenious law students have caused us to be translated to ethereal realms,
where we must function as best we are able." Id. at 495.
159. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1471 (U.S. 2007) (Roberts, J.
dissenting).
160. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, And Wisconsin,
As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380.
161. See Alaska v. United States Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
162. See id.
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The Arizona Brief also mentioned, as part of a closing string cite,
167
Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Department of Transportation.'68 In this
case, Ohio had sought declaratory judgment that federal regulation,
which by its terms preempted a state statute dealing with transportation
of nuclear material through the state, was procedurally and substantively
invalid. 69 The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing.
70
The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Ohio had standing: "Ohio
has standing to challenge the Department's regulation and undertake to
vindicate its own law."' 7'1 The court uses the language of the "zone of
interest" test, 172 but its underlying concern of preemption and state
sovereignty seems paramount. 
73
The final case on this subject mentioned by the Arizona Brie' 74 was
Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover,'75 but this case seems
less useful because the court addressed the standing question only in
passing, relegated to a footnote.176 The court did conclude, however, that
state government officials had standing to challenge regulations that
preempted inconsistent state law.
177
For whatever reason, the Supreme Court chose not to cite any of
these cases, instead leaving the impression that it was taking a maverick
position. The cases seem relevant, however, in understanding historical
background and parameters of the states' special standing to sue federal
167. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, And Wisconsin,
As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380.
168. Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. United States Dep't of Transp., 766 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.
1985).
169. See id. at 230-31.
170. See id. at 231.
The court finds that the State of Ohio's contention is not sufficient to establish
the necessary case in controversy required by Article III of the United States
Constitution. The injury which the plaintiff has envisioned is not an immediate
or threatened injury which would provide the requisite jurisdiction to this court.
Id.
171. Id. at 233.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 232-33:
This Court concludes that since Ohio is litigating the constitutionality of its
own statute, duly enacted by the Ohio General Assembly, Ohio has a sufficient
stake in the outcome of this litigation to give it standing to seek judicial review
of the rule making action of the U.S. Department of Transportation and its
Materials Transportation Bureau.
174. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, And Wisconsin,
As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380.
175. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
176. See id. at 880 n.3.
177. See id.
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agencies, especially where preemption issues are afoot.
D. The Chevron Man
It is worth mentioning, in closing this section, that Justice Stevens
did something similar in a previous watershed case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.178 Chevron also focused on the
EPA's interpretation of its authority under the Clean Air Act, specifically
the "bubble rule" for "stationary sources."' 179  Neither the parties
involved nor the Justices on the Court at the time viewed the case as a
landmark decision about judicial deference to government entities or
organs. Instead, it appeared at first to be an obscure case about technical
regulatory terms.180  While previous Supreme Court jurisprudence on
agency interpretations of law had relied upon a balancing of many
factors, Justice Stevens introduced a bit of a legal revolution with his
two-part test that came to be known as the Chevron Doctrine, a doctrine
which made Chevron one of the most-cited cases of all time.' 8' As
Thomas Merrill explains,
The most striking aspect of the briefs is the absence of any direct
antecedent for the two passages for which Chevron is most famous,
namely the "two-step" approach to review questions of law, and the
justification of deference to agencies in terms of the their relationship
to the President. Justice Stevens apparently came up with these
innovations on his own.182
The paragraph above could just as well have described
Massachusetts v. EPA. As in the new Massachusetts v. EPA decision,
where Justice Stevens also "packaged" a new proposition with
ramifications far beyond the controversy of the case at bar,'83 his
innovation in Chevron did not draw upon the briefs in the case or the
lower court decision. 184 In fact, Stevens himself insisted at the time and
thereafter that Chevron was merely a "restatement of existing law,"'1
85
178. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
179. See id.
180. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORMES 399-428 (Petcr L. Strauss, ed. 2006).
181. See id.
182. Merrill, surpa note 180 at 415.
183. See id. at 400 ("What was new was the way Justice John Paul Stevens creatively
packaged this proposition in his opinion for a unanimous but short-handed Court of six
Justices.")
184. See id. at 413 (noting that the merits briefs focused entirely on the EPA's
deregulation program under President Reagan and the statutory framework of the Clean
Air Act amendments).
185. Id. at 420.
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which is uncanny considering its far-reaching impact on administrative
law and the fact that it became his most famous opinion.' 86 Parallels
between Chevron and Massachusetts v. EPA abound; 87 perhaps it is the
hallmark of Stevens' jurisprudence to create a major new rule ex nihilo in
an otherwise straightforward case. It is possible, of course, to interpret
the lack of precedent for the "special solicitude" verbiage as indicative of
how seriously (or lightly) the Court takes it as a doctrinal matter. Even
so, Justice Stevens has a history of writing landmark decisions about
judicial review of agency activities, packaged in new or unexpected
ways. It is not out of character for him to coin a phrase that becomes an
important doctrine in administrative law.
III. The Special Solicitude for the State Attorneys General
By creating a special standing rule for states, as a practical matter
Massachusetts v. EPA granted standing for state Attorneys General
(AG's).188  Any state litigating against a federal agency would do so
through its Attorney General, so the most immediate effect of the case,
from an etiological standpoint, is for this group. In most cases, an
individual AG makes the decision to litigate as well as which side to
take, independent of other government officials such as the governors.' 89
State AG's must confront formidable costs when contemplating major
186. See id.
187. Both involved the Clean Air Act as the relevant statutory provision, both were
cases about the EPA's interpretation of that statute and a Republican President's attempt
to reduce environmental regulation, both were authored by the same Justice, both stand
for the more abstract notion of judicial deference (either to the agency or to the states),
and both reversed a decision by the D.C. Circuit. Interestingly, Chevron began as a
narrowly divided decision-four to three in the first conference vote-but later turned out
to be unanimous. See id. at 415.
188. For an important discussion of standing for state AG's to bring lawsuits related
to global warming, albeit in the context of nuisance actions against private parties rather
than petitions against the EPA itself, see Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys
General in National Environmental Policy: Global Warming Panel, Part I, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 351, 351-62 (2005). Thomas Merrill makes the following observation, highly
relevant to the Massachusetts v. EPA case and the present discussion about its
consequences:
At no time during this history was it suggested that there was something
inappropriate about federal courts hearing public nuisance suits brought by
State Attorneys General challenging transboundary pollution. Indeed, at no
time during this history was any suggestion made that State Attorneys General
would have to satisfy standing limitations applicable to private litigants in order
to bring such an action.
Id. at 354-55.
189. See generally McGinley, supra note 41 (discussing the conflicts between the
West Virginia AG and other state officials in certain litigation matters); Penn, supra note
41 (discussing the Georgia AG's refusal to heed the governor).
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litigation, 90 and competing priorities regarding their other legal duties
within the state.' 9' Standing is one additional obstacle that every AG
must consider before commencing an action. Relaxing the standing
requirements for states means that there will be one less hurdle-a
significant hurdle that itself could otherwise consume costly litigation
resources-for policy-oriented litigation by the state AG's. Now that the
costs are lower and the chances of success are greater,' 92 proceeding to
litigation will be a rational decision for AG's more frequently.
A. The Evolving Role of the Attorneys General
The office of Attorney General began in medieval England as the
King's legal barrister; 193 by the sixteenth or seventeenth century, it had
evolved into an official position that encompassed all the sovereign's
legal matters. 194 This political institution was imported to America from
its founding; every state has an Attorney General, as does the federal
government. Some states, like Delaware, had an Attorney General from
their inception. 195  Other states created the post later, such as
Connecticut, which did not have an Attorney General until 1898.196
Pennsylvania had an Attorney General from the time it was a Swedish
Colony (starting in 1643), before the arrival of William Penn. 197 The
190. See, e.g., Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National
Environmental Policy, supra note 42 at 339-40 (discussing the various litigation costs
that prevent some smaller states from getting involved in multistate litigation).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. "The modem office of attorney general originated with Edward Il's appointment
of William Langley to the position in 1315." David Villar Patton, The Queen, The
Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective On
Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 142 (2000). Other
reports mention the position decades earlier, in the thirteenth century. See, e.g., Nebraska
Attorney General's Office Organization, History of the Attorney General's Office,
http://www.ago.state.ne.us/content/history.html (last visited July 9, 2007), and
Delaware's Attorney General, History of the Attorney General,
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/office/history.shtml (last visited July 9, 2007).
194. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2002.
195. See Delaware's Attorney General, Past Attorney Generals,
http://attorneygeneral.dclaware.gov/office/past-generals.shtml (last visited July 9, 2007).
Georgia has a similar history. See Office of the Attorney General of Georgia, History of
the Office, http://www.state.ga.us/ago/history.html (last visited July 9, 2007).
196. See State of Connecticut Attorney General's Office, History of Connecticut
Attorney General's Office, http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?a=2132&q=295136 (last
visited July 9, 2007).
197. See Pennsylvania Attorney General, History of the Office of the Attorney
General, http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/theoffice.aspx?id=170 (last visited July 9,
2007). Similarly, South Carolina had an Attorney General from 1698. See South
Carolina Attorney General, Founder's Day Speech, http://www.scattorneygeneral.org/
office/history.php (last visited July 9, 2007).
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traditional role of the AG was to represent the Executive of the state.
In recent decades, the role of the AG has evolved from Counsel for
the Executive Branch into the People's Lawyer, and today it is much
more so.198 In forty-three states, the Attorney General is an elected
position, 99 on the general ballot along with the governor and legislators.
The role of state AG's in multistate litigation has evolved in recent
decades, beginning mostly with cooperative efforts to enforce antitrust
and other consumer protection laws against large, national
corporations. 200  Promulgation of uniform litigation guidelines by the
National Association of Attorneys General facilitated more cooperation
between individual AG's in suing large corporations (who might have
easily fended off lawsuits from small-state AG's otherwise), 20 1 and
certainly the advent of fax machines and email enabled parties to join as
plaintiffs from geographically distant locations.20 2 Multistate litigation,
which began in earnest in the 1980's, focused primarily on civil suits
against large businesses, not against the federal government. 0 3
There is, however, a common element between multistate consumer
protection enforcement and litigation against the federal agencies:
regulatory abandonment by the relevant federal agency. During the
Reagan era, the Justice Department and the FTC withdrew from
enforcing antitrust regulations, leaving a void that the state AG's felt
compelled to fill. 20 4 Similarly, the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse
gases, a position adopted under the George W. Bush administration in
contrast to the agency's earlier position, invited the litigation that led to
Massachusetts v. EPA. In general, one manifestation of a presidential
policy of deregulation is agency inaction on the enforcement and
198. See Davids, supra note 43 at 366; see also State of Connecticut Attorney
General's Office, http://www.ct.gov/ag/site/default.asp (last visited July 9, 2007) (where
the introduction by Attorney General Richard Blumenthal begins, "Welcome. As the
public's lawyer, I am here to defend state laws, protect consumers, and ensure our
children and seniors are safe from abuse and neglect.")
199. See, e.g., National Association of Attorneys General website,
http://www.naag.org/naag/about-naag.php (last visited July 9, 2007), which states:
The Attorney General is popularly elected in 43 states, as well as in Guam, and
is appointed by the governor in five states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Wyoming) and in the four jurisdictions of American Samoa,
the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In Maine,
the Attorney General is selected by secret ballot of the legislature and in
Tennessee, by the state Supreme Court. In the District of Columbia, the Mayor
appoints the Attorney General, whose powers and duties are similar to those of
the Attorneys General of the union's states and jurisdictions.
200. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2003-07.
201. See id. at 2003-04.
202. See id. at 2006.
203. See id. at 2005-08.
204. See id. at 2005.
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rulemaking fronts. Ironically, the unintended consequence of this policy
is an increase in litigation activity by the state AG's in the very same
area, which can prove just as daunting to the regulated industry as
routine oversight by a federal agency.2 °5
B. From Multistate Enforcement to a New Federalism
The multistate litigation of the 1980's and 90's had national
significance, but mostly in the private sector: large, national corporations
would reach settlements that might require adjustments of their business
practices in all fifty States. 206 With the special solicitude rule, the state
Attorney General position takes on more significance for national public
policy concerns, as the cases turn to the national government as a target
instead of national corporations.
In a sense, the election of AG's thus allows voters an alternative
method of influencing national policy, by electing candidates for the
state AG position who are committed to litigating against the federal
government, and are committed to taking a particular side on the issues
of the day. Given the greater ease by which the AG can bring actions
against federal agencies to compel regulation, prospective litigation can
become a significant campaign issue in the elections.20 7 This raises the
stakes in these elections, thereby attracting more media coverage, more
policy debate, and most likely more campaign spending given the
increasingly national scope of the office. It turns the traditional
federalism debate on its head: rather than focusing on the national
government's interference with internal state matters, the new issue is
one of state interference with national governance.
An additional irony of this situation is that the increased recourse to
the federal courts (another way of stating the rule of special solicitude for
standing), the unelected and arguably least-democratic branch of
205. See comments by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, in
Symposium, The Role ofState Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335, 338 (2005):
There are remarkable and really unique opportunities for Attorneys General as
litigators, public interest lawyers, and in part it is increasing because of the
astonishing abdication of power and its abandonment by the federal
government. Much of what Attorneys General do today with the federal
government's failure to meet its responsibilities has provided wonderful
opportunities and obligations for Attorneys General that have never and should
never have existed before.
206. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2006-09.
207. See, Steven Milloy, Love Fest on the Hill, WASH. TIMES, March 25, 2007 at BO1
(For an example of how global warming has become a campaign issue: "Mrs. Boxer
doesn't want legislation this year, preferring instead to have global warming as a
campaign issue in 2008.").
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government, could actually have a democratizing effect. Citizens have
the option of electing individuals to pursue litigation to change national
regulatory policy on their behalf. The nationalization of the office adds a
complex layer to the existing division of executive power in the states
between the governor and the AG.
While having a divided executive creates inefficiency, it provides
for more checks and balances. 20 8 Professor William Marshall recently
explained the democratic benefits of the divided executive:
First, as its architects intended, the divided executive model disperses
power and checks executive branch excess. Second, under the
divided executive, the Office of the Attorney General is, or can be,
appropriately independent of gubernatorial control. Neither ethical
constraints nor structural concerns, properly understood, demand that
the Attorney General exclusively represent the Governor's interests.
Third, by insulating the Attorney General's legal authority from
gubernatorial control, the divided executive protects against
executive branch overreaching by dedicating an executive officer to
uphold the rule of law. Additionally, as the example of intrabranch
litigation suggests, attorney general independence promotes fuller
decision-making before governmental action by assuring
consideration of a wider range of concerns than if the Governor acted
alone. Fourth, the divided executive can be constructed to
accommodate a variety of interests. A state, for example, may
protect the right of an attorney general to exercise independent legal
judgment against the Governor's position in a particular matter while
still requiring the Attorney General to advance the interests of the
Governor when her disagreement is based on pure policy or upon any
other factor deemed to fit best within the final authority of the
Governor. In this way, the Governor's prerogatives can be
accommodated as well.
20 9
Marshall was proposing that the federal executive (i.e., the current
Presidency) could benefit from a similar division of power l° A
division, it seems, has now taken place in another form. The special
solicitude takes some power from the President and confers it on fifty
state AG's rather than the federal AG, which is what Marshall had in
mind.2 1'
C. Self-Selection and Screening Effects
The nationalization of the state Attorney General's role that results
208. See Marshall, supra note 41, at 2267-68.
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from the special solicitude rule is likely to affect the type of candidates
who run for the position, attracting more individuals who are passionate
about national policy issues, and who have national-level aspirations.
The success of candidates will depend upon their ability to articulate
clear policy positions about prospective areas of federal litigation more
than in previous eras, although other factors like party affiliation and
personal charisma will obviously continue to influence voters as well.
This new component of the candidate's electoral appeal, however, can
attract those who might otherwise have sought other political offices, and
can influence which candidates each political party within that state
chooses to run on its ticket.
Similarly, lobbyist efforts focused on these national policy issues
will have a new target at the state AG's office, where the decisions about
whether to litigate and which side to take are likely to occur. The AG's
other national role, litigating over preemption issues, exacerbates this
effect. Recent empirical research indicates that litigation over federal
preemption of state regulation ends at the Supreme Court.212 Congress
does not change the relevant statutes after the Supreme Court has defined
the parameters of the preemption.213 The litigation over regulatory
preemption, an immensely important issue for the regulated parties and
activist groups, determines the ultimate outcome, and lobbying Congress
for a legislative change in the preemption area is either fruitless or does
not occur.2 14  Moreover, the Supreme Court's decisions about
preemption, which tend to be final, tend to come out for and against
preemption in equal numbers.1 5 The odds of winning on final appeal,
therefore, are about 50%, and the cases may be frighteningly close.
Using backward induction, therefore, the state AG's decisions about
litigating a preemption question are of more interest to lobbyists, once
Congress passes the initial enactment, than lobbying in Washington.
This issue works in tandem with the new special solicitude rule to make
the state AG's more of a magnet for lobbying pressures, and hence more
inherently political.
The increasingly nationalized role of the state AG, caused by the
special solicitude rule, also alters an aspect of the office that is deeper
than merely the addition of national policy issues to the traditional slate
of state matters. The new special solicitude rule empowers the state
AG's to be agents of change more frequently because they will have
212. See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical
Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV.
L. REv. 1604 (2007).
213. Seeid. at 1614-19.
214. See id. at 1620-22.
215. See id. at 1612-13.
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standing to innovate and bring new legal challenges in more cases.
Special solicitude also permits a state AG to effect change, or at least
contribute significantly to it, on a more grandiose scale. The traditional
Attorney General was more of an officeholder, dutifully discharging
legal tasks much the same as any other attorney in that position would
have done.2 16 The new AG is an agent of change.21 7
Being an agent of change highlights the interesting distinction
between "achievement" and "accomplishment" in public service (and in
any other prestigious position, for that matter).218  Achievements are
remarkable things to which we attain, like titles and positions.
Accomplishments are the remarkable things we actually do, the ways in
which we operate as individual agents of change. 219 Where there is a
high office whose duties or tasks are largely constant and foreordained, a
person attaining to the position has made an achievement. To distinguish
oneself from the crowd and to rise above one's peers is perhaps the most
common object of ambition or aspiration for those seeking advancement
in their careers.220  This is achievement, advancement in the midst of
216. See Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
613, 619-23 (2005), for a review of the duties of state attorneys general in the arena of
nonprofit organization law. Silber says of the traditional role of state attorneys general:
The historical assignment to attorneys general of the responsibility for
protecting assets belonging to the public (patens patriae) typically empowers
them to investigate operations and prosecute wrongdoing on behalf of the
public. Most attorneys general also have the authority to stand in the shoes of
injured parties and to sue on their behalf when doing so is in the public interest.
Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
217. Cf Ben A. Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 519, 546-47 (2005) (suggesting that the Model Policy set out by the
Federation of State Medical Licensing Boards that establishes guidelines for pain
management will create an opportunity for state attorneys general to become "agents of
change."). Rich says that the 2004 Model Policy invokes the state attorney general "as a
potential agent of change in the regulatory law and policy of pain management." Id. at
546. He also says:
The political reality, of course, is that no state attorney general is likely to be
held accountable by voters for not vigorously seeking to overcome state legal
and regulatory barriers to pain management, advance care planning, or quality
end-of-life care. Consequently, the role of the attorney general in breaking
down these well-known and long-standing barriers will be highly idiosyncratic,
depending on the personal perspective and motivation of the office holder.
Id. at 547-48.
218. Of course, many writers use the terms interchangeably, but here they provide the
necessary words to express an important distinction.
219. SeeGraham, supranote47, at 118-19.
220. See James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance:
Rising Above the "Pay-for-Performance " Principle, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 413, 422-23 (2006)
(discussing the failure of the idea that money is the sole motivating factor behind an
executive's level of professional performance). McConvill analyzes what really
motivates a person to "climb the corporate ladder," and cites to Martin Seligman's book
Authentic Happiness for the proposition that "[a] career entails a deeper personal
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competition. Being the Attorney General was once an achievement.
Merely obtaining a coveted position, however, is different from
being a tne agent of change. Even performing competently in some
high office is distinguishable from producing something new or changing
the way things are. 22 For example, former Secretary of State Madeline
Albright claims in her memoirs222  that one of her greatest
"accomplishments" was being the first female Secretary of State.223 This
seems to be a misnomer: attaining to a high office is more properly an
achievement than an accomplishment.224 Admittedly, she reached a
higher political office than any other woman in American history, 225 and
in this sense, her achievement was a milestone. Albright speculates that
future generations of young women can now have higher expectations,
and possess greater opportunities for their careers, thanks to her. 6
investment in work. You mark your achievement through money, but also through
achievement. Each promotion brings you higher prestige and more power.., as well as
a raise .. " Id. at 422. The more seniority an employee has, he argues, the more money
becomes less of an incentive and other factors become the main motivators. See id. at
422-23.
221. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 54-
85 (2000) (chronicling "instances of administrative regulators advancing broad-based
interests at the expense of concentrated, mobilized interests," such as the EPA deciding to
more strictly regulate ozone and particulate matter). Id. at 54. Corley surveys examples
of administrative decisionmakers achieving different goals, often in the face of stringent
opposition from Congress.
222. See MADELINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY (2003).
223. Id. at xi-xii, 510-11. Actually, she cites few if any other accomplishments
besides this, apart from the handful of international crises that came and went under her
watch, as they do under every Secretary of State.
224. It would be one thing if she claimed to have saved the world from nuclear war,
as Adlai Stevenson arguably did, or from economic collapse, as Alan Greenspan and
Warren Buffett possibly did when they contained the domino effect of the Long Term
Capital debacle in 1997. In Albright's case, she simply handled or managed crises that
arose. The conclusion was typically frustration rather than triumph, as with the Rwandan
Genocide and the rather inexplicable emergence of Al Qaeda as a quasi-superpower. The
only triumph seems to be her claimed contribution to the feminist cause-and this was
"accomplished," in part, by the unfortunately stereotyped road of marrying the right man,
for which Albright is almost apologetic. See id. at 37-38. Albright's "achievement"
(being appointed by Clinton) also resulted in large part from her political activity.
225. As Secretary of State, perhaps the only positions better would be President or
Vice-President. Of course, one could reasonably contend that being a Supreme Court
Justice is every bit as significant, and two women have attained this office. For whatever
reason, Albright does not focus on the achievements of other women who were her
contemporaries, except for passing references.
226. See id. at 510-11. Albright writes:
But the encounters that mean the most to me are with women of various ages
who recognize the real me and come up to say thank you. I especially treasure
the young women who say that my example has inspired them to raise their
sights so that they now feel that serving as secretary of state or in even higher
office is a realistic goal.
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Perhaps this is true, as the next President went a step further and
appointed the first African-American Secretary of State, followed by the
first African-American female Secretary of State. Yet Albright's
classification of her appointment as an "accomplishment" that paved the
way for these successors requires an element of "but for" causation: but
for her success in climbing the political ladder so high, future women
could not have done so. This is not merely speculative; it is highly
debatable. Does she really mean that other women would have to try
harder, or be more credentialed and qualified, to attain high positions if
not for her ascendance to the office?
The point here is not to criticize Madeline Albright (I have praised
her in print elsewhere),227 but to clarify the changed office of the state
Attorney General. Her case presents a nice illustration of the underlying
change under consideration here. Albright's claimed "accomplishment"
was actually the decisional act of another, the President who appointed
her. His decision probably included a consideration of her stellar
credentials and experience, but she herself was not the agent performing
the act that constituted the "accomplishment." Once in the position, she
may have seen herself as an influential person, but she does not claim to
have accomplished any great feats in execution of her responsibilities.
Her purported accomplishment was getting the job in the first place
despite the historical discrimination against her gender. 22  Yet this
"accomplishment" was the deed of another person, and this seems like a
contradiction. She may have achieved something great, but she did not
"accomplish" the feat in question. Achievement, in this sense,229
227. Dru Stevenson, Book Review: Madam Secretary, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 467 (2006) (reviewing MADELINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY (2003)).
228. In fairness, at least one psychological researcher, however, has found a pattern of
difference between genders in how they perceive their own "achievements," with women
(at least in American culture) focusing more on the process of their strivings and men
focusing more on their personal impact. See Joseph Veroff, Process vs. Impact in Men's
and Women's Achievement Motivation, I PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 283 (1977). I understand
Professor Veroffs use of "impact" to be roughly analogous to my use of the word
"accomplishment" as opposed to "achievement."
229. While I focus here partly on agency, linguist Patrick Caudal uses "achievement"
versus "accomplishment" to distinguish semantic concepts related to temporality; that is,
"whether an event should be considered as an accomplishment (i.e., a non-atomic event,
possessing internal subevents) or an achievement (i.e., an atomic event, lacking any
internal subevent)." Patrick Caudal, Achievements vs. Accomplishments: A
Computational Treatment of Atomicity, Incrementality, and Perhaps of Event Structure,
Conf6rence TALN 1999, at 9 (1999), http://www.atala.org/doc/actestaln/AC_0127.pdf
(emphasis in original) (last accesed Aug 1, 2007). I agree with his distinction, and our
use of the dichotomy overlaps to the extent that "achievements" in obtaining public
offices occur at a precise point in time (date of inauguration, date of appointment or
confirmation, etc.). "Accomplishments," on the other hand, bespeak an incremental
process or ordeal, a feat toward which the actor works.
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depends on the decisions of others; accomplishment is what the subject
herself does.
Achievement can depend on merit,230 of course, and meritocracy
seems just and fair when compared to alternatives like simony and
nepotism. Innate talent, credentials, resources, and cooperation from
others are factors related to both achievement and accomplishment.23'
Accomplishments are different from achievements because the former
can create merit, while the latter acknowledges it.
232
The traditional role of the state AG stands for achievement. The
public service involved could be somewhat pedantic as far as litigation
goes, and the office was typically a stepping-stone to becoming a Senator
or Governor.23 3 With the special solicitude rule, however, each AG has
230. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Affirmative Action and the American Creed, 16
WILSON Q., Winter 1992, at 52, 54 ("The market calls for meritocracy and the rejection of
nepotism and other forms of favoritism. Hiring the best qualified person whether he or
she be black or white, Jewish or Gentile, native or foreign born, is the best way to
maximize economic returns.").
231. Cf R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending
Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1030-46 (2001) (arguing that
class-based school admissions do not violate meritocratic principles, as there are
"resource disparities" that influence a person's performance in school but are not the fault
of that person; rewarding an economically disadvantaged person is not anti-meritocratic);
Tuneen E. Chisholm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 677, 706
(1999) (writing that white Americans have an unfair advantage over African Americans,
therefore "a true meritocracy cannot be achieved unless everyone starts with a clean slate
or, at least, a fair allocation of the basic resources that ensure full citizenship.") (citation
omitted).
232. The distinction between achievement and accomplishment being advanced here
is reflected in the disparate treatments of moral luck in philosophical literature. Claudia
Card, for example, focuses much more on the random luck involved in our innate
abilities, opportunities for obtaining marketable credentials, etc. See generally CLAUDIA
CARD, THE UNNATURAL LOTTERY: CHARACTER AND MORAL LUCK (1996). Others, such
as Richard Posner and Bernard Williams, focus more on luck as an aspect of the
consequences of our decisions or actions. See Williams, supra note 46; Milner v. Apfel,
148 F.3d 812, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.); United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202,
206 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (most legal commentary focuses on the former). See also
United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Sentelle, J., dissenting);
Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections On Law And Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1523, 1557 n.95 (2007); Nir Eyal, Egalitarian Justice And Innocent Choice, 2 J. ETHICS
& SOC. PHIL. 1 (2007); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity Of Alternative Liability
And Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 450 (2006).
233. See Marshall, supra note 41, at 2253 (2006)
(In states where the Governor and the Attorney General are independently
elected, the two officers may come from different political parties with
diametrically opposed partisan agendas .... Add to this the political reality that
the Office of the Attorney General has long been seen by many of its occupants
as a stepping stone to the Governor's office and the blueprint for confrontation
and conflict is manifest.)
(citation omitted). See also Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the
State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1,23 (1993)
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the potential to be an agent of change on the national level, to accomplish
things instead of achieving them. Massachusetts v. EPA is itself a
striking example of this phenomenon, besides being the catalyst for more
of the same. The distinction between achievement and accomplishment
also helps illustrate the difference in screening effects for those seeking
the office. Civil servants seeking a high position as an end in itself may
find themselves replaced by those seeking a position that offers a unique
opportunity to effect frequent and large-scale change, a position with
special solicitude from the Supreme Court for this purpose.
D. Cooperation and Competition
The special solicitude rule also alters the job of the state AG by
increasing both the cooperation and competition between them and their
2323
counterparts in other states. 23 In the last two decades, the AG's have
started to build consortiums to litigate one side of an issue. 23' This
allows pooling of resources, which is necessary for smaller states, as well
as increased credibility that comes from greater numbers and greater
geographical diversity on the same side of a case.236 One logical
outcome of relaxed standing requirements is an increase in state-led
suits. The increase in such suits will require state Attorneys General to
cooperate and collaborate more with their counterparts from other states.
At least one commentator2 37 has suggested that this scenario could
present Constitutional problems, especially under the "Compact
Clause, 238 which forbids states from making agreements or compacts
with other states without the consent of Congress. 239 Litigation against
(The risk that an attorney general will compromise professionalism and bend to
political pressure in rendering opinions and carrying out law enforcement
responsibilities is greater with a popularly elected and politically ambitious
attorney general who has gubernatorial aspirations. History teaches that many
of them do. Elective attorneys general are more likely to regard the office as a
political stepping stone.)
(citations omitted).
234. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2003-08 (discussing at length the cooperative
alliances between the AGs in multistate litigation).
235. See id. at 2004-08.
236. See id. (describing these effects for multistate antitrust and consumer protection
cases, as well as the tobacco litigation).
237. See id. at 2016-17.
238. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, c1. 3.
239. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2016-17; see also Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S.
56, 63 (2003) (mentioning the constitutionality of the Black-Jenkins Award under the
Compact Clause); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000) (addressing the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999) ("Under the Compact Clause, States cannot form an
interstate compact without first obtaining the express consent of Congress; the granting of
such consent is a gratuity.") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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these multistate coalitions yields few favorable outcomes, 240 although
there are no significant cases focusing on litigation consortiums. The
Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the issue in Massachusetts
v. EPA, but carefully sidestepped it by focusing explicitly on one state,
Massachusetts, and ignoring the claims of the others.241 Compact Clause
analysis involves two critical inquiries: whether Congress approved the
agreement (which it usually does),242 and whether the interstate
agreement increases the political power of the states enough to infringe
upon the federal structure.243 Both of these present some potentially
cumbersome concerns for cases, like Massachusetts v. EPA, that may
arise in the future. In Massachusetts v. EPA, Congress authorized the
suits against the EPA under the Clean Air Act, but not necessarily the
banding together of states in groups as parties in such litigation.244
Perhaps the informality of the agreement allowed it to escape the Court's
attention, 245 but maybe no one raised it in the appeal.
More troubling is the traditional rule that interstate compacts are
permissible where they pose no threat to the federal structure or federal
power. In United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission,246 the
Court found that there was no such infringement because the Tax
Commission increased state power over private corporations and
240. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452
(1978) (finding no constitutional infirmity with the Multistate Tax Commission); Ne.
Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (finding no
violation of Compact Clause in Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes offering
reciprocity to other New England states for regulation of bank holding companies); Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 542 v. Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, 311 F.3d
273 (2002) (finding no violation of Compact Clause by Toll Bridge Commission).
241. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453-54 (2007).
242. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2018; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686.
243. United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 456; see also Lynch, supra note 48, at
2016-17.
244. It might be possible to infer Congressional acquiescence for multistate litigation
groups under the Clean Air Act from Section 176(A)(a) of the 1990 amendments,
addressing interstate spillovers of nitrogen oxides, and the EPA's creation of the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group (OTAG), which became the subject of litigation in the
celebrated case Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For
purposes of satisfying the Compact Clause, Congressional approval of an agreement can
come via administrative agencies and regulations, such as the EPA's OTAG project. See,
e.g., Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 967 F.Supp. 564, 566 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd 132
F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (statute giving Secretary of Agriculture authority to
implement regional dairy compact only upon his finding of "compelling public interest"
in compact region did not constitute unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to
consent to interstate compacts; compact had already been conditionally accepted by
Congress).
245. If true, this seems to contradict the Court's previous holding that the nature or
form of the agreement is not the issue, but rather its effect on the federal government.
United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 470.
246. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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taxpayers, but not the federal government."4 The special solicitude rule
gives states standing to sue the federal government, which they are likely
to do in groups; this could implicate the Compact Clause in a way that
has not arisen before. Even so, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
ignored the issue, and it is therefore unclear whether this represents tacit
approval for purposes of precedent, or merely an issue the parties missed
in their briefs.248
Interstate litigation alliances also create some level of competition
between state AG's over which one will take the lead position in a high-
profile case.249 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the decision was serendipitous:
the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing under Article III was crucial
to the case, and Massachusetts' comparatively long coastline and the
state government's ownership of significant stretches of beach 250 made
for a more colorable argument of injury or prospective loss from rising
sea levels. 251  This aspect may explain Alaska's otherwise striking
247. See id. at 472-73.
248. See generally Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Bridge Over Troubled Waters: The
Application Of State Law To Compact Clause Entities, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 163
(2005) (for more recent discussion of problems with Compact Clause jurisprudence).
249. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2004 (noting that so far, the states' AG's offices
appear to be "so closely coordinated that those participating in the case will usually
choose one or two lead states and cede to them primary responsibility for negotiating
with the defendant on behalf of all the states involved"). Regardless of the outward
appearance of a unified front and a designated leader, from the perspective of someone
working inside an AG office at the phase when the global warming cases were still under
contemplation, this writer can attest that internal discussions about who gets to lead can
be animated.
250. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007)
(These rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts' coastal land.
Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal
property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.
The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next
century. If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official
believes that a significant fraction of coastal property will be either
permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic storm
surge and flooding events.)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Of course, California, another plaintiff
in the case, has a longer coastline than Massachusetts, but California has a special
exemption from some of the preemption scope of the Clean Air Act. Given that the
majority in Massachusetts v. EPA relied on federal preemption as a major justification for
creating the special solicitude rule, using California as the primary plaintiff for standing
purposes would have undermined this rationale.
251. See id. n. 19
(For example, the [Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation]
owns, operates, and maintains approximately 53 coastal state parks, beaches,
reservations, and wildlife sanctuaries. [It] also owns, operates and maintains
sporting and recreational facilities in coastal areas, including numerous pools,
skating rinks, playgrounds, playing fields, former coastal fortifications, public
stages, museums, bike trails, tennis courts, boathouses, and boat ramps and
landings. Associated with these coastal properties and facilities is a significant
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membership in the opposing consortium, as mentioned before: the
defendants may have recruited the state with the longest coastline of all
to offset this point. If a particular case is likely to be popular with
citizens from several states, there can be a race to be the first state to file
suit in order to lock in the state's name in the case caption before others
join.252
E. Are Activist Groups Left Out?
Activist groups, such as the National Resource Defense Council
(NRDC) or Sierra Club, may find that they have a diminished role for
litigation against federal agencies in light of the special solicitude rule.
Of course, the Massachusetts v. EPA case began with special interest
groups who petitioned the EPA for rulemaking under the Clean Air Act,
so in a sense they initiated the case.253 That was before the "special
solicitude" rule came into play, however. Another possible
manifestation of the same phenomenon would be an increase in litigation
partnerships between activist groups and state AG's offices, as these
special interest groups turn to the AG's to help their case get standing in
federal court.
Activist groups now have an inferior position, at least regarding
standing, compared to the state Attorneys General. Citizens desiring
policy changes will prefer legal advocacy by a representative with a
magic token for standing and are more likely to look to the Attorneys
General for this purpose.254 The declining litigation role for activist
groups may lead to an internal organizational shift toward other
activities, like education, publicity, and lobbying. The replacement of
amount of infrastructure, which the Commonwealth also owns, operates, and
maintains, including roads, parkways, stormwater pump stations, piers, sea wall
revetments, and dams.)
(citations omitted).
252. See Stephen M. Axinn, Developments In Mergers and Acquisitions, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 403, 417 (1989) (discussing prosecutorial rivalry between states in
antitrust enforcement).
253. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449, n. 15. Nineteen activist groups
commenced the litigation with a rulemaking petition under the Clean Air Act. These
groups wcre Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power Tcchnologies, Inc.;
Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries Assn.; Clements
Environmental Corp.; Environmental Advocates; Environmental and Energy Study
Institute; Friends of the Earth; Full Circle Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode
Island; Greenpeace USA; International Center for Technology Assessment; Network for
Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ; New Jersey
Environmental Watch; New Mexico Solar Energy Assn.; Oregon Environmental Council;
Public Citizen; Solar Energy Industries Assn.; The SUN DAY Campaign. Id.
254. For a possible example, see Korsinsky v. EPA, 192 Fed.Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2006)
("Korsinsky's primary claim, that global warming and carbon dioxide emissions may
cause him a future injury, is too speculative to establish standing.").
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the private activist group with the state AG's could alter the nature of the
litigation. Attorneys General have many competing duties, and a broad
range of constituents (the electorate in their state) to appease.255 More
importantly, state AG's are likely to litigate together with other states, as
they have been doing for several years, in order to pool resources,
specialize various litigation tasks, and obtain economies of scale and
greater credibility.2 56 In contrast, the NRDC and Sierra Club historically
litigated environmental cases alone. Greater resources on the part of the
plaintiffs permit greater undertakings. At the same time, many of the
decisions that litigants must make along the way, especially pertaining to
strategy, venue selection, specific demands, and settlement negotiations,
must occur collectively when the states are litigating together, and this
must affect the nature of the litigation.
IV. States Compelling Federal Agencies to Regulate
Massachusetts v. EPA also held that the states could attack federal
inaction and compel agencies to regulate.257 Combined with the special
solicitude rule on standing, this part of the holding could have far-
reaching implications for the enhancement of state power. Essentially,
states now have special standing to force the hand of the federal
government, at least in promulgating regulations.258 In this regard, the
Court emphasized that there is a significant difference between
enforcement and rulemaking by agencies; the former is less susceptible
to compulsion than the latter.259 Agencies retain much more discretion
about enforcement-whether to enforce, when to enforce, remedies to
seek, etc.260 Agencies have less discretion, however, about promulgating
255. See comments by Stephen Rowe, Attorney General of Maine, in Symposium,
The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 335, 342-43 (2005)
(So why didn't I join this effort? There were several reasons, basically
logistical. We saw it as being resource intensive. It's an interstate suit-we're
plaintiffs so once we pull the trigger, there's work to be done. We have 7
lawyers in our air resource division, and we're involved with these other suits:
against EPA for failure to list C02; we're also defending a lot of suits on the
state level. The first priority is defensive litigation. The second priority is to
lend support to our essential services. Another priority is the enforcement of
state environmental laws. And then we can be plaintiffs in interstate suits. We
saw large out of pocket expenses.).
256. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 2008.
257. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (saying that states have a right to
challenge agency inaction as arbitrary and capricious, in effect compelling them to
regulate).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 1459.
260. See id. In Town of Castle Rock. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), the Court
upheld agency discretion in enforcement decisions, albeit in a completely different
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rules than they do about enforcing them, at least in the aftermath of this
case.
261
A. The Majority's Analysis
The EPA argued alternatively that it could not, and would not
regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.262 The first argument
was less defensible in this particular case, but would have been
invincible if true. Without statutory authority to regulate, no party (or
court) could possibly require the agency to do so; it would simply be
illegal. The Court held that in this case the EPA clearly could regulate
because Congress delegated that authority to the agency.263 This holding,
however, is completely dependent on this statute and these facts. This
part of the Massachusetts v. EPA decision has the least relevance for
future cases. In other cases where federal agencies can show that they
lack authority to regulate, that would still be a winning argument.
The contrary is true with respect to the EPA's second argument. It
significantly changes the rules of the game for future litigation. The
EPA argued that discretion of authority to regulate something necessarily
implies discretion not to regulate as well.264 The majority did not adopt
this symmetry-based approach.265
Instead, the majority focused on the word "judgment" in the
enabling statute,266 which it interpreted in light of the standard word
"shall" that accompanies it.267 The word "judgment" thus becomes the
primary "regulatory variable, 268 in this case, the word whose ambiguity
is both the conduit and the boundary of Congress' delegation of
authority. "Put another way, the use of the word 'judgment' is not a
context-fending off Section 1983 liability for an "act of omission," rather than
challenging standing to challenge purposeful agency silence.
261. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459.
262. See id. at 1460-62.
263. See id. at 1462.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 1463.
266. See id. at 1462
(The alternative basis for EPA's decision-that even if it does have statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this
time-rests on reasoning divorced from the statutory text. While the statute
does condition the exercise of EPA's authority on its formation of a
"judgment," 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), that judgment must relate to whether an
air pollutant "causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare .. )
(citations omitted).
267. See id.
268. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, On Regulatory Variables and
Statutory lnterpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103 (1995); Dru Stevenson, To Whom Is The
Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL' REV. 105, 167 (2003).
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roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise
discretion within defined statutory limits. '269  The EPA apparently
argued that "shall" was the keyword of delegation in the text, and that the
word "judgment" was a modifier that limited the force of "shall., 270 The
Court, in contrast, treated "judgment" as the regulatory variable with
"shall" as the modifier limiting the agency's judgment.271
This is very significant. 272  "Shall" and "judgment" (a.k.a.
"discretion") are ubiquitous in the landscape of agency enabling
statutes.273  For the Court to hold that "shall" is the limiter and
269. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. It seems to me that Justice Stevens is espousing the exact same view he held in
his dissenting opinion in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (1986),
except that here he writes for the majority. Nowhere does Massachusetts v. EPA cite or
acknowledge the holding in Young, which deferred to an agency refusal to regulate, even
though Massachusetts v. EPA seems to be overturning Young.
273. The word "shall" generates endless confusion, as it contains so much semantic
ambiguity. Sometimes the confusion centers on whether "shall" means "must" or "may,"
that is, whether it is permissive or mandatory (the same issue presented in Massachusetts
v. EPA). See In re Trusteeship of First Minneapolis Trust Co., 277 N.W. 899, 902 (Minn.
1938) ("Provisions which are mandatory in form are often held to be directory, and those
which are directory in form are often held to be mandatory because such words as 'may,'
'shall,' 'must,' and 'will' are often used without discrimination. All of them are elastic
and frequently treated as interchangeable.") (citations omitted). The UNIFORM STATUTE
AND RULE CONSTRUCTION ACT (1995) devotes Section 4 to this problem, and posits that
"'Shall' and 'must' express a duty, obligation, requirement, or condition precedent."
Uniform Stat. & Rule Constr. Act § 4(a). "May," by contrast, "confers a power,
authority, privilege, or right." Id. § 4(b). This would seem to settle the question in
Massachusetts v. EPA in favor of the majority, and against Scalia's dissent. The official
Comment to this section, however, muddies the water with this attempted clarification:
"The context of a statute or rule may indicate that a "shall" or "must" is directory and not
mandatory." Id. In Doe v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 694 A.2d 1218 (Conn. 1997),
the Connecticut Supreme Court held that "shall" was merely "directory" and not
"mandatory." See also Lomelo v. Mayo, 204 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(holding that when "shall" appeared twice in the same sentence, it was mandatory the
first time and permissive or directory the second time); Keenan v. Young, 195 N.E.2d
382, 385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) ("The word 'shall' may be construed as meaning
permissive or directory (equivalent to 'may') to carry out the legislative intent and in
cases where no right or benefit to anyone depends upon it being taken in the
imperative."). See also Ian K. Peterson, When "May" Means "Shall": The Case for
Mandatory Liquidated Damages Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 35 STETSON L. REV.
1051 (2006) (arguing that "may" means "shall" and that "shall" is mandatory); Hope
Caldwell, Difference Between "Shall" and "May" Saves Liquor License, 3 LAWYERS J. 1
(Sept. 21, 2001); Michele M. Asprey, Shall Must Go, 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79
(1992) (arguing that "shall" should never be used in legal writing because of its tendency
to generate confusion); Reed Dickerson, Choosing Between Shall and Must in Legal
Drafting, I SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 144, 144-45 (1990) ("That convention is to use
the modal shall to denote a flat-out command, the breach of which risks legal discipline,
and to use must to denote merely a condition precedent to legal effectiveness.")
(emphasis in original).
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"judgment" is the modifier, it means that not only the EPA, but also
other agencies, will face an ongoing mandate to promulgate rules. The
agencies' discretion to regulate is not discretion to abstain.274 The
problem here is not the typical conundrum of statutory interpretation,
ambiguity in the words, or the choice between plain vernacular meaning
and technical usage. Instead, the question is which word modifies the
other. This may seem like an arcane word game, but it directly
implicates the nature and scope of judicial review in future cases,
2 7 5
Chevron deference,276 and even federalism. The decrease in agency
discretion here means more power for states to challenge agency refusals
to regulate.
B. Scalia's Dissent
In his dissent,277 Justice Scalia was characteristically incredulous.
"The question thus arises: Does anything require the Administrator to
make a 'judgment' whenever a petition for rulemaking is filed? '278 He
As if this were not confusing enough, "shall" is also used in a future temporal sense,
somewhat interchangeably with "will," but there is controversy over whether one or the
other of these words is supposed to imply more "force" when used with different tenses
of verbs. See Gertrude Block, Differentiating "Shall" and "Will," 23 PA. LAW. 68
(2001) (Historically, shall, in the first persons singular and plural (that is, following I or
we), would indicate simple futurity. "However, shall, when used in the second and third
persons singular and plural (you, he/she and they), would now [after the 17th century] be
'determinative' (that is, would mean 'must.')" Will meant the exact opposite.); Howard
Darmstadter, Shall? Will? Who Makes the Rules? 7 Bus. L. TODAY 8, 10 (1998),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/7-5legal.html:
(The Oxford English Dictionary and Fowler's Modem English Usage (third
edition) are of the view that in British English, shall in the second and third
person (you, he, she, it, they) expresses the speaker's determination or
insistence while will expresses mere futurity. In the first person (I, we), it's the
reverse, with shall expressing the simple future and will indicating
determination.... If you try to persuade a court that we shall is more emphatic
than we will, you are likely to lose.).
274. In some ways, the asymmetrical position of the agencies after Massachusetts v.
EPA is analogous to the mandatory voting laws in the American colonies (and some
foreign states today), where citizens could incur criminal penalties for failing to vote. In
that situation, freedom to vote does not necessarily imply freedom not to vote. This
stands in contrast, for example, to Free Speech concepts, where compelled speech would
certainly not be considered "free."
275. If a matter is in the purview of agency discretion, then the standard of review is
abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the decision is "arbitrary and capricious." This is the
most deferential standard of review, and the agency merely needs to articulate that it had
some reason, however tenuous, for its decision. If a decision is not a matter of agency
discretion, then the reviewing court can apply a "substantial evidence" test, or even
something stricter.
276. See infra Section IV.C.
277. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1471-78 (2007).
278. Id. at 1472 (emphasis in original).
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alleges that the majority cites no statutory authority,2 79 which is only
partly true. The majority dutifully cited and dissected the relevant
statute, 28 as explained above. Scalia is correct, however, that these
paragraphs in the majority's opinion lack citations to other cases. Yet
apart from one case about a statute that explicitly required rulemaking,
28'
Scalia seems guilty of the same offense. He lacks cases for his opinion
as well, but for a passing reference to Chevron.28 2
Scalia sarcastically characterizes the majority's decision as
"invent[ing] a multiple-choice question that the EPA Administrator must
answer when a petition for rulemaking is filed., 283 His a-b-c packaging
of the majority's requirements of agencies, however, provides readers
and future generations of jurisprudes with a clearer statement than we
might otherwise have gleaned from the majority's opinion. Scalia
reduces it to a tidy, memorable three-part test, probably aiding his
opponents unwittingly. Thus, we have the three-part Massachusetts v.
EPA test:
1. Did the agency conclude that the relevant statute could include the
fact scenario giving rise to the litigation? If yes, the agency must
make rules.
2. If not (to question 1), then the agency may refrain from
rulemaking.
3. If the agency cannot answer the first question, it must provide a
detailed justification for being unable to decide, i.e., strong evidence
of overwhelming uncertainty.
Like the majority, Scalia also focuses on the word "judgment,"
279. See id. ("Without citation of the statute or any other authority, the Court says
yes. Why is that so? When Congress wishes to make private action force an agency's
hand, it knows how to do so.").
280. See id. at 1462.
281. See id at 1472 (citing Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 254-55 (1986)
(discussing the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 92 Stat. 1926, 29
U.S.C. § 816(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V))).
282. See id. at 1473-74
(The Court nowhere explains why this interpretation is incorrect, let alone why
it is not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). As the Administrator acted
within the law in declining to make a "judgment" for the policy reasons above
set forth, I would uphold the decision to deny the rulemaking petition on that
ground alone.).
283. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1472.
284. See id. (I paraphrase here to make the three-part test more general in
applicability.).
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setting it off in quotation marks for emphasis. 85 He begins, however,
assuming arguendo that "the Administrator's discretion is not entirely
unbounded-that if he has no reasonable basis for deferring judgment he
must grasp the nettle at once. 286 This is a long way of restating the
"shall" concept, except he uses some double negatives and substitutes
"must" instead of the statutory term "shall." In his view, however,
"judgment" is a temporal prerequisite to "must [regulate]. 287 In that
sense, "judgment" qualifies or limits "shall." As he thinks Chevron
deference applies to "judgment," rather than to "must" or "shall," a court
would almost never reach the latter and decide to compel an agency to
regulate. Instead, under his scheme, courts will defer almost
automatically to the agency's "judgment," as long as there is some
scintilla of support for it.
Scalia is correct that the majority seems to have gone beyond the
traditional "hard look" doctrine, which used an "abuse of discretion" or
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 288  The "hard look"
doctrine usually imposes a burden of production on agencies, 289 and
sometimes a burden of persuasion. 290 The holding in Massachusetts v.
EPA apparently imposes at least a burden of persuasion, if not a burden
of proof, in cases where the agency balks at regulating. 29 1 For better or
worse, Scalia's characterization in this regard seems accurate: the Court
is using stricter scrutiny than it usually would in "hard look" cases. The
more searching review of the agency's position seems to be an
unavoidable consequence of interpreting words like "judgment" and
"discretion" as the primary regulatory variables, which "shall" or "must"
merely cabins in. All of these are stock terminology in the enabling
statutes by which Congress delegates rulemaking tasks to the agencies.
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. See id. at 1472-73.
288. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 69 at 523 n.71 ("The legal language to which
a substantive or a procedural hard look is tied usually remains the 'arbitrary and
capricious' clause of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)."); see also Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
289. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 69, at 527-29.
290. See id. at 521; see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51-52.
291. Elsewhere in the decision, however, the Court says that it is still "highly
deferential" to the agency in refusal-to-regulate cases:
They moreover arise out of denials of petitions for rulemaking which (at least
in the circumstances here) the affected party had an undoubted procedural right
to file in the first instance. Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to
judicial review, though such review is "extremely limited" and "highly
deferential."
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459. See also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 69, at
536 (citing earlier circuit court decisions for the notion that agencies receive "high end"
judicial deference for refusals to regulate).
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292
Scalia has always been a champion of the Chevron Doctrine,
which would seem to make him pro-agency (he espouses judicial
deference to the agencies). Yet this case illustrates another principle of
Scalian jurisprudence: a bias against more numerous regulations as a
general matter. This is a question of sheer regulatory quantity, not
quality (like the burdensomeness of the regulations, etc.). He seems to
suggest that courts should leave agencies alone if they are refraining
from rulemaking. Moreover, the promulgation of regulations generates
text (words) that Scalia can attack as being outside their more obvious
common meanings, under the first part of Chevron analysis. In contrast,
his application of Chevron to the word "judgment" means there will be
almost nothing to criticize about a refusal to regulate, as long as the
293caisagency offers some reasonable basis for its inaction. In sum, Scalia's
use of Chevron and his choice of "judgment" as the word to which its
analysis would apply shows (or would require if applied) a bias toward
fewer regulations from a numerical or quantitative standpoint.
C. Chevron Analysis
The two previous sections alluded to the Chevron Doctrine, which
is a centerpiece of administrative law. Both the majority and dissent
(Scalia) in Massachusetts v. EPA cite Chevron, and the same Justice
(Stevens) authored the majority opinions in both of these key cases.294
Massachusetts v. EPA joins the large corpus of jurisprudence on
Chevron. It also purports to resolve some unsettled aspects of the
Chevron Doctrine itself.295 Exactly what Massachusetts v. EPA does to
Chevron, however, could be the subject of differing opinions.
Chevron itself has come to stand for the proposition that courts
should defer to administrative agencies' interpretation of their enabling
statutes, in any instance where the governing statute itself is ambiguous
or unclear.2 96 The Chevron Doctrine usually appears as a two-part test:
first, whether the statute is clear and unambiguous, and second, if
ambiguous, then whether the agency's interpretation is "reasonable. 297
The threshold for reasonableness is low; the agency typically wins if the
292. See Merrill, supra note 180.
293. Apparently, even contending that the agency is overworked or that it is waiting
to see what will happen in the next presidential election would suffice as a rationale for
deferring "judgment."
294. See discussion supra Section II.D.
295. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459 ("Some debate remains, however,
as to the rigor with which we review an agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking.").
296. See Merrill, supra note 180, at 400-01.
297. See id.
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court reaches the second step of the test.298 The number of Chevron
Doctrine cases that conclude at the first step, with a finding that the
statute is clear, suggests that many of the cases are outcome-driven.
When the court divides over step one of Chevron Doctrine analysis, it
occasions dictionary-dueling by the Justices. 299 One side (usually Scalia)
argues that the meaning is explicit and unambiguous, while the others
find a range of possible definitions for the word in their dictionaries.
The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA applies Chevron in two ways.
First, it states that Chevron mandates profound judicial deference to
agency decisions about whether to bring enforcement actions. 300  The
Court marks this as the "height" or maximum of Chevron deference.
30 1
Second, the Court also disparages Justice Scalia's dissent in a footnote,
30 2
298. See, e.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (deferring to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services regarding the regulation of the food toxin
aflatoxin); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112
(1987) (discussing the agency's understanding of whether it could approve certain labor
dispute settlements); but see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988)
(ruling against the agency on step two); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26
(1990) (ruling against the Department of Labor on Chevron step two analysis).
299. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994)
(majority and dissent engaged in argument about which dictionary should be used to
determine the correct interpretation of "modify"); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v.
Donavan (the Cotton Dust case), 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (dictionary definition of "feasible"
forms basis for court's holding); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (dictionaries consulted to discern the proper meaning of "disposal");
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
523, 552 (1992) ("Justice Scalia himself slavishly relies on dictionaries to interpret
statutes .. "); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990) (explaining Justice Scalia's use of dictionaries within his overall interpretive
framework). The trend is decidedly toward increasing use:
[I]n the six Terms between 1987 and 1992, the Court never cited dictionaries
fewer than fifteen times, with a high point of thirty-two references during the
1992 Term. Dictionary definitions appeared in twenty-eight percent of the 107
Supreme Court cases decided by published opinion in the 1992 Term-a
fourteen-fold increase over the 1981 Term. The trend toward increased
dictionary use has been pervasive: the Court has referred to twenty-seven
different dictionaries since 1988 in cases involving not only statutes, but also
constitutional provisions and administrative codes.
Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437,
1438-39 (1994) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See also STEPHEN G. BREYER
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLIcY 298-99 (1999).
300. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct at 1459 ("The scope of our review of the merits
of the statutory issues is narrow. As we have repeated time and again, an agency has
broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to
carry out its delegated responsibilities.").
301. See id. ("That discretion is at its height when the agency decides not to bring an
enforcement action.").
302. See id. at 1460 n.26
(In dissent, JUSTICE SCALIA maintains that because greenhouse gases
permeate the world's atmosphere rather than a limited area near the earth's
surface, EPA's exclusion of greenhouse gases from the category of air pollution
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saying that both the phrases "ambient air" and "air pollution agent" are
perfectly clear (Chevron step one, which normally ends the analysis), and
even if the phrases were ambiguous, the Court says they could not
possibly mean what the EPA says they mean (Chevron step two
analysis).3 °3 This second Chevron maneuver is historically typical. The
first, however, seems to cut new ground, designating specific scenarios
that would mark the upper and lower boundaries of Chevron deference.
One way to read Massachusetts v. EPA, then, is to say that it requires
high deference for agency enforcement decisions and low deference for
decisions about whether to make rules. This is very significant in light of
the circumstances of the case, as well as the special solicitude holding of
state standing. Not only do states have a lower standing threshold, but
they can more readily force agencies to promulgate regulations.
The classic examples of the Chevron Doctrine are cases where the
agency takes a single statutory term and expands or elaborates upon it in
its promulgated regulations304 (the original case was about the definition
of "stationary source" under the Clean Air Act)-clearly a matter of
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory verbiage. Massachusetts
v. EPA explicitly extends the doctrine's reach to agency decisions about
whether to regulate and whether to enforce, which are less directly
matters of agencies interpreting statutes and more simply a choice of
whether to act at all. In this sense, Massachusetts v. EPA may expand
the range of the Chevron Doctrine, even while it sets upper and lower
limits to it in this new arena.
It is also possible to read the Court's holding as simply focused on
its application to the verbiage "shall [promulgate/regulate]." In other
words, we could characterize the majority as applying Chevron step one
ambiguity analysis to "shall [regulate]," at least by implication, which
nearly forces the conclusion that the statute is clear and the agency's
"agent[s]" is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) .... EPA's distinction, however, finds no support in the text
of the statute, which uses the phrase "the ambient air" without distinguishing
between atmospheric layers. Moreover, it is a plainly unreasonable reading of
a sweeping statutory provision designed to capture "any physical, chemical ...
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient
air."... JUSTICE SCALIA does not (and cannot) explain why Congress
would define "air pollutant" so carefully and so broadly, yet confer on EPA the
authority to narrow that definition whenever expedient by asserting that a
particular substance is not an "agent." At any rate, no party to this dispute
contests that greenhouse gases both "enter the ambient air" and tend to warm
the atmosphere. They are therefore unquestionably "agents" of air pollution.)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
303. See id. at 1462.
304. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (discussing the INS
interpretation of the words "fear," "threatened," etc.).
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duties unavoidable. We could similarly characterize Scalia's opinion as
applying Chevron step two analysis to this phase instead, and finding the
agency's interpretation of "shall" (as permissive) to be reasonable.
Under this reading, Scalia is applying Chevron step one analysis
(ambiguity assessment) to "judgment,, 30 5 but step two analysis (the
reasonableness assessment) to "shall," "agent," and "air pollutant.
3 6
The majority seems to do the reverse, at least by implication.
D. Rulemaking vs. Enforcement
The Court moves on after its passing reference to Chevron and
focuses instead on the inherent differences between agency
"nonenforcement ' '30 7 and refusals to regulate, and proceeds to analyze
this distinction even beyond the Chevron two-step analysis. The
majority offers four key differences, explaining that refusals to regulate
are: 1) less frequent than refusals to enforce existing regulations;
30 8
2) more "apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis;,
30 9
3) "subject to special formalities;, 310 and 4) responses to petitions for
305. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1473: "EPA's interpretation of the
discretion conferred by the statutory reference to 'its judgment' is not only reasonable, it
is the most natural reading of the text. The Court nowhere explains why this
interpretation is incorrect, let alone why it is not entitled to deference under
Chevron .. " (citation omitted).
306. See id at 1472-77. Justice Scalia also singles out the word "including" for
Chevron ambiguity assessment (that is, Chevron step two), but only in passing: "Once
again, in the face of textual ambiguity, the Court's application of Chevron deference to
EPA's interpretation of the word 'including' is nowhere to be found. Evidently, the
Court defers only to those reasonable interpretations that it favors." Id. at 1476. This is
mostly a corollary of his treatment of "air pollutants;" as he explains in a footnote:
Not only is EPA's interpretation reasonable, it is far more plausible than the
Court's alternative. As the Court correctly points out, "all airborne compounds
of whatever stripe," ante, at [1460], would qualify as "physical, chemical,...
substances or matter which [are] emitted into or otherwise enter the ambient
air." It follows that everything airborne, from Frisbees to flatulence, qualifies
as an "air pollutant." This reading of the statute defies common sense.
Id. at 1476 n.2 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
307. See id. at 1459.
308. See id. Apparently, the significance of this fact is that the uncommonness of
refusals to regulate make it more feasible for courts to scrutinize the agency's decision,
whereas scrutiny of every instance of nonenforcement would require day-to-day
oversight and meddling by the courts in the agency's internal affairs.
309. Id. Judicial review has its primary functionality in settling questions of law and
is least useful (and least justifiable) for second-guessing determinations of fact by the
agency or by lower courts-assuming one believes there is a real-world distinction
between questions of law and fact.
310. Id. The Court cites 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) for this proposition. Here is the relevant
provision:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written
application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in
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rulemaking, which carry their own procedural right for the petitioner. 31 1
Instead of citing its own precedent, the Court cites312 the D.C. Circuit's
decision in American Horse Protection Association. Inc. v. Lyng,
313
which made the distinction to allow itself review of an agency refusal to
regulate despite the Court's nearly absolute deference requirement (for
nonenforcement decisions) in Heckler v. Chaney.314 The Court officially
adopts this position of the D.C. Circuit, finding a distinction between
rulemaking and enforcement. 315 The Court previously noted in Heckler
that it did not yet have an opportunity to consider whether an agency
could refuse to regulate, but hinted that it would find that the agency
lacked discretion for such abstention: "Although we express no opinion
on whether such decisions would be unreviewable under § 701(a)(2), we
note that in those situations the statute conferring authority on the agency
might indicate that such decisions were not 'committed to agency
discretion.' '3 6 Massachusetts v. EPA afforded the opportunity that was
missing in Heckler v. Chaney.
The reasons quoted from the American Horse Protection case were
directly related to the circuit court's need to work around Heckler v.
Chaney. There are even stronger policy rationales that would support the
distinction, but they were not readily available in a quotable form like the
litany in American Horse Protection. For instance, it is easier to find a
statutory mandate or duty for rulemaking.31 7 Enforcement by necessity
must be more a matter of discretion. 31 8  Rulemaking is much more
connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or
when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of the grounds for denial.
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000). This seems to be a small error in the opinion, at least as it
appears on Westlaw; the Court should have cited 5 U.S.C § 553(e), not § 555(e), because
the former is the one that actually gives the right to petition for rulemaking: "Each
agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment,
or repeal of a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000). § 555(e) merely requires agencies to offer
"grounds" for denial in writing. In any case, the Court connects it with greater judicial
review apparently because the "formalities" implies procedural due process
considerations, etc.
311. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct at 1459. The third and fourth reasons seem
a bit redundant, or at least closely related.
312. See id.
313. Am. Horse Protection Assn. Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
314. Heckler v. Chaney 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
315. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct at 1459.
316. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
317. See id. (where the Court writes, "[n]or do we have a situation where it could
justifiably be found that the agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities,"
indicating that abdication of statutory responsibilities was a genuine concern, even if the
facts in Heckler did not rise to this level, as refusals to regulate might do).
318. Actually, the D.C. Circuit made this point at length in American Horse
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lengthy, and costly for the agencies. The APA notice-and-comment
requirements 3 9 and the "hard look" doctrine320 have the combined effect
of inducing agencies to beef up the "record" in a case with a dizzying
array of internal memoranda, minutes of meetings, and detailed scientific
studies. 32' Agencies are resistant to investing resources into new
rulemaking, especially in controversial areas. The rulemaking process,
being more tedious and less flexible than enforcement, is therefore less
responsive to genuine crises or public outcry for government action.32 2 It
is foreseeable that agencies would need prodding from the courts for
rulemaking more than they would for enforcement.
There is also a frequent phenomenon of path dependence 323 for
agency rulemaking,32 4 and this fact bolsters the idea for pushing agencies
to regulate. Where no regulations exist, inertia weighs against change. It
can seem overwhelming to the agency to strike out into a completely new
area, so it may be much easier to tweak existing regulations, or to step up
enforcement, than to promulgate new rules from scratch. Once a basic
regulatory framework is in place, it tends to follow a trajectory whose
next steps are predictable. It will be much easier for future
Administrations to ratchet up the rules or to intensify the agency's
enforcement efforts. There is significant value, therefore, in forcing an
Protection, but in a less "quotable" way, discussing the analogy made in Heckler v.
Chaney to prosecutorial discretion. See Am. Horse Protection, 812 F.2d at 4.
319. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); AMAN & MAYTON,
supra note 69, at 527.
320. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
321. For a discussion of the costs for agencies in promulgating rules subject to
judicial scrutiny, see Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual
Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and the Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528 (2006).
322. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 69, at 99-110.
323. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, And
History, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (for a general introduction to the concept of
path dependence in law and economics).
324. See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case For Top-Down Corporate
Law Harmonization In The European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 939, 954
(2006); Paul Teske, Wither the States? Comments on the Daca Federal-State Framework,
4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 365, 369 (2006); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time
For Retirement? 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1087 (2005); Donald T. Hornstein,
Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 Duke L.J. 913, 928 (2005);
Gail Chamley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and
Public Health Protection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 363, 365 (2002) ("Environmental health
regulation is path-dependent: actions taken now affect the nature of actions taken later.");
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1334 n.458 (1995)
("One wonders in light of the history of securities regulation how much the heavily
substantive approach of contemporary environmental law owes to path dependence
concerning the choices of original legal strategies rather than to deliberative choice.").
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agency to create rules where none exists.
325
E. More Standing, More Litigation, More Regulation
Enabling statutes have historically been ambiguous and inconsistent
about when agencies can regulate and when they must regulate. It is
noteworthy that the Supreme Court was aware of the unresolved issue in
1985 when it decided Heckler v. Chaney, but had its first opportunity to
settle the question in 2007. Massachusetts v. EPA tacitly invites states to
push agencies to regulate in a variety of settings. Perhaps Congress
previously intended to delegate discretion to the agencies about whether
to regulate, but Massachusetts v. EPA instructs otherwise; the enabling
statutes thus function as a mandate.326  Even so, in practical terms an
agency can still shirk its statutory duty, at its discretion, until a petition
for rulemaking triggers judicial review of the agency's inaction. The
Court has thus shifted some of the regulatory discretion to the states by
providing an express route for them to trigger rulemaking by the federal
agencies. The delegation comes in the form of an option that states can
exercise: they can decide whether to sue, even if the agency cannot
legally decide to refrain from regulating. This new "option-exercise
delegation" may compel Congress to change the way it drafts enabling
statutes.
3 27
Giving fifty state AG's a say in whether new regulations are
necessary would logically lead to more regulations overall. The option-
delegation result of Massachusetts v. EPA pertains only to the
commencement of rulemaking, not to force repeal. More regulation is
not always a bad thing,328 although each new regulation invariably
presents some additional compliance costs for the regulated industry.
325. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 361 (192 1):
The real problem with bureaucracies is not that they are rash, but the opposite.
When not actually rotten with dishonesty and corruption they universally show
a tendency to "play safe" and become hopelessly conservative. The great
danger to be feared from a political control of economic life under ordinary
conditions is not a reckless dissipation of the social resources as much as the
arrest of progress and the vegetation of life.
326. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation Of Delegated Power:
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035
(2006), demonstrating that Congress delegates more discretion to the courts when they
want more stability over time, and are less concerned about inter-issue consistency.
Congress does this by providing statutorily for more occasions of judicial discretion and
by its decisions about how much ambiguity to include in the statute.
327. See generally id. (suggesting that Congress' intent in delegating discretion varies
depending on how much stability Congress thinks is desirable in a particular area).
328. See Tiersma, supra note 83, at 1262 ("A final manifestation of the increasingly
textual nature of case law is a growing, almost insatiable, demand for more precedent.").
The following subsections expound upon this notion in more detail.
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
1. Knightian Uncertainty and Beneficial Overregulation
The special solicitude rule, combined with the agencies' diminished
discretion to refrain from rulemaking, introduce countervailing effects
for uncertainty in the regulatory arena. If the decision about whether to
regulate was previously the prerogative of one Administrator, now there
are fifty individual AG's who share that prerogative. If the future
decisions of one individual are relatively inscrutable, then that
uncertainty has seemingly multiplied, as any one of them could bring an
action to trigger rulemaking in a new area. On the other hand, once the
initial rulemaking occurs, it usually follows a predictable trajectory. If
the regulated industry perceives rulemaking to be inevitable at some
point in the future, but subject to a wide range of possible tracks, then it
reduces uncertainty significantly to get the initial regulatory phase out of
the way. This was the thrust of Entergy Corporation's argument in its
amicus brief.329 Entergy argued that the lingering uncertainty about
future regulations and liability, which could be sudden and drastic if the
EPA does nothing until there is some climate-related catastrophe, seemed
more burdensome to the business than complying with whatever
regulations the EPA is likely to promulgate if it starts now.
330
This point provides a nice illustration of a phenomenon that has
mostly eluded academic attention 331 up to this point: the decreased
uncertainty resulting from more regulation can provide a benefit that
offsets-or even outweighs-the greater compliance costs that those
regulations impose on the regulated industry. Increased compliance
costs may lower net revenues (mistakenly called "profits" in common
parlance), but greater uncertainty can lower investment or share prices,
independent of the company's earnings statement.
Economist Frank Knight famously articulated the difference
329. Brief for Entergy Corporation As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at *3-
4, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2540802.
330. See id. at *3:
The energy needs of the United States are expected to double over the next 50
years, and Entergy and its fellow industry members need to plan-and act-
now for the strategic capital investments-viewed on a 25-year horizon-that
will be necessary to meet this increased demand. Entergy seeks certainty with
respect to the regulatory regime it must operate under, and does not believe that
EPA's current position on C02 regulation will stand the test of time.
331. Professor Jonathan Masur has a forthcoming article in the Vanderbilt Law
Review that discusses how excessive judicial deference to agencies can give the agency
too much discretion and can trigger an overreaction by Congress, both of which have a
chilling effect on the regulated industry because of the increased uncertainty about the
regulatory regime. See generally Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility
of Agency Commitments, __ VAND. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=940458.
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between risk and uncertainty in his classic text Risk, Uncertainty, and
Profit. Risk pertains to possibilities whose odds are knowable, at least
from an actuarial standpoint, while uncertainty pertains to possibilities
whose odds are unknown, or where the possible outcomes themselves are
a matter of speculation.332  Knight's primary interest was
entrepreneurship and compensation for business leaders.333 At the same
time that he differentiated between risk and uncertainty, he distinguished
true "profits" (windfall rewards resulting from luck or a rare stroke of
genius 334) from net revenues (what most people call "profit"), the latter
being largely compensation for the entrepreneur's time, skills, assumed
risks, and deferred interest.335
332. See KNIGHT, supra note 325. To summarize, risk involves multiple possible
outcomes of a scenario, where the odds of each outcome are fairly clear and quantified.
An example would be a bet (or lottery or raffle) where the chances of winning are one in
fifty; or, for that matter, the Reader's Digest Sweepstakes, which typically has odds on
the order of one in two hundred million. Uncertainty, in contrast, involves either
unknown or unknowable possible outcomes. Knightian uncertainty may involve a finite
set of reasonable possibilities where it is impossible to ascertain beforehand which is
more likely, or how much more likely. Of course, uncertainty could refer to an infinite
range of outcomes or possibilities as well. See also Johan Deprez, Note, Risk,
Uncertainty, and Nonergodicity in the Determination of Investment-Backed Expectations:
A Post Keynesian Alternative to Posnerian Doctrine in the Analysis of Regulatory
Takings, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1221, 1237-46 (2001); Claire A. Hill, How Investors React
to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 283, 297-309 (1998) (discussing investor
skittishness in response to any signs of political turmoil); see generally John E. Calfee &
Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Sanctions, 70
VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing generally that uncertainty over-deters and under-deters
the wrong people, respectively); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed
Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1990).
333. See John McKinney, Frank H. Knight on Uncertainty and Rational Action, 43 S.
ECON. J. 1438, 1443-44 (1977).
334. See generally KNIGHT, supra note 325 at 333. At the same time, he notes that
the boundary between genius and luck is blurry.
The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of
superior judgment. But it is the judgment of judgment, especially one's own
judgment, and in an individual case there is no way of telling good judgment
from good luck, and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or
determine its probable value transforms the profit into a wage.
Id. at 311, 337.
335. See id. at 310-11 (this is also a recurring theme throughout his book).
If it is necessary to distinguish between profit and wages, it is just as vital to
contrast profit with payment for risk-taking in any ordinary sense of the terms.
An insurer, in so far as his business is reduced to a science, takes no risk; the
risk in the individual case of the insured is obliterated on being thrown in with
the multitude of cases of the insurer. And it is immaterial whether the cases are
a homogenous group of similars or whether each is objectively in a class by
itself, if the true probability can be ascertained. The "risk" which gives rise to
profit is an uncertainty which cannot be evaluated, connected with a situation
such that there is no possibility of grouping on any objective basis
whatever.... The only "risk" which leads to a profit is a unique uncertainty
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Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan says that
reducing Knightian uncertainty in the overall marketplace was one of his
primary objectives as manager of the American economy, as such
uncertainty causes both high inflation rates and stock market crashes.3 36
The presence of too much Knightian uncertainty can have profound
effects on economic development, as it stifles investment 337 and
generates unnecessary losses. 338  People are intuitively averse to
uncertainty, even more than they are averse to risk.339 They will steer
their resources away from it when possible. The possibility of sudden,
radical moves by any governmental branch introduces genuine
uncertainty into many facets of society.340  Frank Knight called
uncertainty the "essential evil" of modem progressive states. 34' This
creates a paradox where the sole causative agent of true profits,
uncertainty, also causes overall losses taken together, and entrepreneurs,
as a group, lose far more often, and to a far greater degree, than they
win.
3 42
Knight made a few other observations that are particularly relevant
to Massachusetts v. EPA and the discussion here. First, he explains that
a modem society can manage uncertainty in two basic ways. One
approach is to distribute the risk as widely as possible, so that everyone
resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility which in its very nature
cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried. Profit arises out of the inherent,
absolute unpredictability of things, out of the sheer brute fact that the results of
human activity cannot be anticipated and then only insofar as even a
probability calculation in regard to them is impossible and meaningless.
Id.
336. See Alan Greenspan, Innovation and Issues in Monetary Policy: the Last Fifteen
Years, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 33, 37-40 (2004).
337. See generally Takao Asano, Portfolio Inertia Under Ambiguity, 52
MATHEMATICAL SOC. Sci. 223-225 (2006); Joshua Aizenman and Namcy Marion,
Volatility and Investment: Interprting Evidence from Developing Countries, 66
ECONOMICA 157 (1999) (showing that in developing countries, private investment
decreases when there is more uncertainty, at the same time that public spending tends to
increase); Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Flight to Quality and
Collective Risk, MIT DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER No. 06-07 (Mar. 15,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-891856.
338. See, e.g., Jijrgen Eichberger, David Kelsey, and Burkhard Schipper, Ambiguity
and Social Interaction, (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=464242.
339. See, e.g., Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J.
ECON. 643 (1961) (the article whose conclusions came to be known as Ellsberg's
Paradox); Paolo Ghirardato & Massimo Marinacci, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation
of Utility and Beliefs, CALTECH SOC. SC., WORKING PAPER No. 1085 (Feb. 2001),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=260578; Asano, supra note 337 (for an example of
the distinction between Ellsberg's subjective ambiguity and true Knightian uncertainty).
340. See generally Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, reprinted in
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 316-326 (Paul Slovic, ed. 2000).
341. KNIGHT, supra note 325, at 347.
342. See id. at 364-65.
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bears a share of the net losses. The other is the American free-enterprise
approach of concentrating all of it on certain individuals (entrepreneurial
executives), who volunteer to bear the brunt of the uncertainty in
exchange for the small chance of windfall profits.343 The latter approach,
whereby the entrepreneur internalizes all the uncertainty costs (costs of
mistakes), seems to increase social welfare for everyone else, as the rest
of society obtains the benefit of resources being allocated for efficient
production, without the costs of uncertainty, which the businessman
bears alone.344
The reverse effect occurs when we vest too much discretion or
responsibility in individual government agents, because the costs of
mistakes fall upon everyone. Higher discretion for a state actor, then, is
the distributive approach to uncertainty, because the individual official
will not bear the costs personally, but rather they fall on everyone in the
purview of the official's decision. Frank Knight's insight implies that
vesting full discretion in individual state actors is inherently anti-free-
market because for him, the essence of free-market capitalism is the
concentration of mistake costs on individual entrepreneurs, simultaneous
with the redistribution of the benefits of their productivity. In the
Preface to the 1948 edition of his book, Knight states: "In political
terms, the problem of stabilization is to accomplish the result of a
government of law, for, apart from political objections, too much
discretion in the hands of administrators will defeat the end of
[consumer] confidence. 345  In other words, he explicitly links the
collapse of markets to excessive rulemaking discretion in the hands of an
individual agency director.346 Once rules are in place, however, agency
personnel become extremely predictable, greatly reducing the systemic
uncertainty.
347
As Entergy Corporation anticipated in its rather maverick brief,
348
the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA reduces
uncertainty by forcing the promulgation of rules that will set the
trajectory for regulations in the decades to come. The regulated industry
will face some new burdens in the form of compliance costs, but the
343. See id. at 347-49, 370.
344. See id. at 278 ("It is unquestionable that the entrepreneur's activities effect an
enormous saving to society, vastly increasing the efficiency of economic production.").
345. Id. at xlv.
346. Knight also sees the election of officials, whose abilities and judgment are
somewhat unknown, as another source of uncertainty. See id. at 288.
347. Seeid. at 361.
348. Brief for Entergy Corporation As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at * 1-
4, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2540802.
Entergy opens its memorandum admitting: "This case makes for strange bedfellows." Id.
at *I.
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same businesses are more likely to attract passive investors now that
regulatory uncertainty is lower.3 49  As stated above, 350 reduced
uncertainty encourages investment and therefore increases the
companies' share prices, even if the company must cope with some new
compliance costs. Arguably, share price is more important to the
regulated industry in the long term than present net revenues. 351 Any
executive whose compensation includes a hefty bounty of stock options
has a personal incentive to focus more on share value than on current
earnings minus operating costs. Our legal system imposes a fiduciary
duty on managers to put the interests of passive investors ahead of their
own, 352 so the managers of the regulated industry seem to have a legal
obligation to consider the uncertainty-reducing benefits of regulations.
This, however, would require looking at the long term as opposed to
immediate earnings, which is relatively rare. 353 In any case, the Court's
distinction between agency discretion in rulemaking and discretion in
enforcement makes sense from an economic standpoint, because the
former plays havoc with system-wide uncertainty while the latter does
not. The Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA on agency refusals to
regulate thus reduces uncertainty and can boost share values of the
regulated industry. In addition, the special solicitude rule spreads the
discretion about rulemaking from one Administrator across fifty AG's, as
discussed above.
2. To Whom Is the Law Addressed?
Commentators usually focus on how new regulations will constrain
the regulated industry, as if legal rules control only the citizenry and not
the government itself. Nevertheless, regulations also act as a restraint on
an enforcement agency, in part by setting predictable limits within which
the agency must conduct its enforcement.
354
349. Knight's discussion focused almost entirely on the motivations of entrepreneurs,
i.e., what would possess businessmen to take the gambles that they do in the face of so
much evidence that they are likely to fail. He does not really address the issue of share
prices or passive investors at all, or the investors' clear aversion to uncertainty.
350. See supra notes 329-47.
351. This is not to say that net earnings are not a significant component of current
share value, but rather that they are not the sole component; market uncertainty is also a
vital ingredient in trading prices for stocks, as discussed above.
352. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
353. Some recent economic literature has called for agencies to do the same. See,
e.g., John Stranlund & Yakov Ben-Haim, Price-Based vs. Quantity-Based Environmental
Regulation Under Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Robust Satisficing Perspective,
UNIV. OF MASS. AMHERST RES. ECON. WORKING PAPER No. 2006-1 (July 2006), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-920463.
354. Frank Knight observed alternatively that discretion in the hands of a sole
administrator generated excessive uncertainty, see KNIGHT, supra note 325, at xlv, but
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In addition, rulemaking activity diverts agency resources away from
enforcement, to the process of proposing and implementing the rules.
355
Those concerned about the cost-benefit analysis of regulations should
offset the compliance costs not only by the enhanced share values, but
also by the fact that other costs related to agency enforcement actions
must necessarily decrease at the same time.
3. Does Regulatory Overlap Dilute the Regulatory Burden?
The Court in the Massachusetts v. EPA case mentioned the overlap
with the Department of Transportation's (DOT) rules about automobile
efficiency.356  The EPA contended that this overlap would make its
prospective regulations redundant and could yield contradictory
results.357 These are two separate problems, of course. The point about
regulatory redundancy is a concern that the EPA will waste valuable time
and resources promulgating emissions rules and bringing enforcement
actions, only to find that the DOT is already doing the same thing. The
second point is the concern that the EPA and the DOT could, in theory,
promulgate contradictory rules or adopt contradictory strategies for
enforcement. The Court viewed the overlap as harmless because the
also that bureaucrats are excessively cautious and tend to follow established rules and
protocol slavishly, see id. at 361. Entergy Corp. expressed grave concern about the
prospect of being subject to some type of post-Kyoto international regime that would
provide few procedural safeguards and protections for individual parties. It is unusual for
a member of the regulated industry to look past immediate compliance costs and see that
things could be worse in the absence of American legal restraints and safeguards. See
Brief for Entergy Corporation As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at *4,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2540802.:
Finally, Entergy is far less sanguine than EPA about the prospect of this
nation's air-quality decisions being decided by the international community.
Entergy prefers the considerable safeguards of the CAA rulemaking process,
which provides for participation by interested parties sensitive to this nation's
needs and fosters (through judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act) decisions grounded in sound scientific debate. The international debate
offers no comparable guarantees, and therefore none of the security of the
American rulemaking process.
I have argued elsewhere that legal rules bind state actors directly and the public by
implication only, following in the tradition of writers like Hans Kelsen and other
positivists. See generally Dru Stevenson, To Whom Is The Law Addressed?, supra note
268.
355. The Entergy Brief hints at this as well; it hopes the EPA will produce something
that will bind the agency in the future and give the regulated industry the opportunity to
plan around it.
356. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1451, 1462.
357. See id. at 1451 ("But because Congress has already created detailed mandatory
fuel economy standards subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) administration,
the agency concluded that EPA regulation would either conflict with those standards or
be superfluous.").
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agencies can easily collaborate and avoid cancelling each other out.
358
Jacob Gersen has argued that overlapping jurisdiction can create a
healthy competition between agencies that provides Congress with useful
information about which agency merits more delegated authority in the
future. 359 This is similar to a point made long ago by Herbert Simon, that
jurisdictional conflicts can bring to light the most significant unsettled
policy issues for the highest authority (in regulatory cases, either
Congress or the courts) to examine and resolve. 360 Gersen's view lends
support to the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which left the
possibility of overlapping jurisdiction open, although the Court seemed
to assume the agencies would collaborate rather than compete.
While the EPA was concerned about redundancy and contradictory
results in the Massachusetts v. EPA case, regulated industries probably
worry instead that overlapping jurisdiction between agencies would
simply increase or compound the regulatory burdens (compliance costs).
The logic would run along the lines that two regulatory regimes must be
twice as bad (burdensome) as one. Each could impose its own rules, and
each presents its own probability of bringing enforcement actions.
It is rational for the regulated industry to prefer less regulation
instead of more, but there may be some hidden advantages for the
regulated industry that flow from overlapping jurisdiction. First, the
potential for overlapping jurisdiction and regulations can dilute the
impact of each agency's actions. For example, instead of competing and
encroaching on each other's territory, each agency may steer clear of the
other agency's regulatory sphere in order to avoid unpleasant conflicts
between directors, or the contradictory actions that the EPA feared with
greenhouse gas regulations. This leaves a regulatory gap somewhere in
the middle between the two agencies, areas left unregulated or
unenforced by both agencies involved. The EPA's refusal to regulate
greenhouse gases, which led to the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation in the
first place, is a clear example of this phenomenon, 361 where one agency
refuses to act because it fears encroaching on another agency's "turf,"
leaving a huge regulatory gap (no regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
358. See id. at 1462 ("The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think
the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.").
359. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract id=981765. Gersen's main thesis is that courts should defer to agency
interpretations about the extent of overlap in their jurisdiction with other agencies,
because overlap eventually brings agencies more in line with Congress' intent. See id.
360. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 195 (4th ed. 1997).
361. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct at 1462 ("But that DOT sets mileage
standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities.").
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at all). 362  The same phenomenon can occur in more subtle forms,
however, leaving discreet regulatory gaps that the regulated industry can
exploit to its advantage. Even after the EPA and the DOT promulgate
their regulations, the same collision-avoidance principle can create gaps
in their enforcement activities.
363
Similarly, agencies may approach jurisdictional overlap as an
opportunity for shirking and conserving resources. If an agency feels
that its resources are limited (as most do), it would be tempting to leave
certain areas of time-consuming rulemaking and costly enforcement
activities to the "other" agency that shares jurisdiction over the area.
When both agencies do this (avoid an area in hopes that the other will
tackle it), more regulatory gaps appear, which again benefit the regulated
industry by alleviating compliance costs (where neither agency
promulgates rules) or limiting their probability of sanctions for
noncompliance (where neither agency brings enforcement actions).
In addition, even where both agencies do regulate simultaneously,
there should be a diminishing marginal value for the additional
regulations and enforcement actions. This is similar to the EPA's
concern about wasting its time on duplicative work. Suppose, for
example, that the DOT issues stricter mileage regulations for the
automobile industry (which would reduce overall carbon dioxide gas
emissions) before the EPA can issue its rules for greenhouse gas
emissions. From the industry's standpoint, it may already be in
compliance-or at least partially compliant-with the EPA's rules, due
to the previous DOT requirements.364 The marginal cost of the EPA's
362. Professor Gersen mentions the possibility of agency shirking when there is
overlapping jurisdiction, and seems to blame this on Congress rewarding the competing
agencies based on results instead of effort. See Gersen, supra note 359, at 207-16.
363. While Gersen seems to assume that agencies aggressively seek to expand their
own jurisdiction (an assumption that underlies his argument that agencies engage in
healthy competition when assigned overlapping jurisdiction by Congress), Frank Knight
asserted that bureaucracies are cautious and overly conservative, not aggressive, rash, or
competitive. Knight explains:
Another interesting misconception in regard to the public official should be
pointed out before we leave this topic. It is common and natural to assume that
a hired manager, dealing with resources which belong to others, will be less
careful in their use than the owner. The view shows little insight into human
nature and does not square with observed facts. The real trouble with
bureaucracies is not that they are rash, but the opposite. When not actually
rotten with dishonesty and corruption they universally show a tendency to
"play safe" and become hopelessly conservative. The great danger to be feared
from a political control of economic life under ordinary conditions is not a
reckless dissipation of the social resources so much as the arrest of progress
and the vegetation of life.
KNIGHT, supra note 325, at 361.
364. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA contended that their regulatory activities of
carbon dioxide emissions could be entirely redundant if the DOT also regulated car
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additional regulations, therefore, is substantially lower than if the EPA
had issued its regulations in isolation.
365
As another example of the diminishing marginal cost of additional
regulations, suppose that a previously unregulated firm (perhaps in an
area of new technology) suddenly becomes the object of new DOT
regulations. Besides the explicit changes in manufacturing processes
required by the regulations, the firm will face new internal overhead
costs, such as the creation of a "compliance office" with staff to collect
the necessary data for reporting to the agency, ex ante legal counsel
about the regulatory parameters and potential sanctions, etc. Once this
overhead is in place, the addition of more regulations from a parallel
agency would impose far fewer costs because there is already a
compliance unit for handling reporting, monitoring, and so on.
Even where the overlapping agencies collaborate and coordinate
their efforts, which the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA assumes they will
do,366 the resulting regulatory burden is likely to be no greater than it
would be if a single agency took responsibility. If the agencies do
coordinate their activities, we can assume they would divide the tasks
between them, assigning specific parts of the rulemaking and
enforcement regime to one side or the other. Rather than having both
promulgate overlapping rules or both bring enforcement actions,
coordination is most likely to ensure that only one of the agencies does
each task. This is not to say that collaboration will actually occur, as the
Court hopes; agencies often avoid interacting with each other.3 67 To the
extent that they do collaborate, however, due to division of labor the
regulatory burden is likely to be the equivalent of a single-agency regime
rather than doubled.
From the standpoint of Knightian uncertainty described in Section
IV.E. 1.,368 regulatory overlap can also dilute the potential costs for the
emissions via mileage requirements. This is an argument at the extreme, however,
because there is a continuum of possible overlap between the two sets of regulations. It
seems just as likely that they would be only partially redundant. If so, this would mean
that the EPA's regulations have some value (perhaps a necessary tweaking of the pre-
existing DOT regulations), but for the regulated industry, the additional cost is
incremental as well.
365. An important caveat to this idea is the "knee of the curve" problem as described
in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204-05 (1989), where the costs
of reducing pollution decreased with each incremental step, until a certain threshold
where the costs skyrocketed (the knee of the curve). This can happen because the
technology is largely unavailable for guaranteeing complete elimination of certain
pollutants.
366. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct at 1462.
367. Mutual avoidance, of course, creates the types of regulatory gaps (either in
enforcement or rulemaking) that I have already discussed.
368. See generally KNIGHT, supra note 325.
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regulated industry by making discretion less concentrated in a single
Administrator. 369 A single agency possessing full authority can make
more drastic mistakes than an agency working in tandem-or in
competition-with other agencies. Concentration of power increases
uncertainty about future rulemaking and enforcement activities. Where
agencies share jurisdiction, change is likely to occur more slowly,
providing more predictability for the regulated industry.
Herbert Simon suggests that jurisdictional ambiguity encourages
adjudicators to focus on expediency or results in that case rather than the
proper allocation of authority. 370 The Massachusetts v. EPA case seems
to illustrate this principle, in a sense: the majority expressed more
concern about the global issue than about leaving the decision to the
designated authority on air regulation. Overall, this jurisprudential
phenomenon would seem to benefit regulated industries, because it
implies that courts are more likely to take note of cost-benefit analysis of
regulatory actions in cases where agency jurisdiction overlaps. Cost-
benefit analysis usually works to the industry's advantage in litigation,
because it allows their compliance costs to be a factor in the court's
decision where otherwise the court might have ignored them. To the
extent that Simon's principle works and courts respond to overlapping
jurisdiction by focusing more on the results or costs involved, the
industry receives an advantage in litigation.
A completely separate issue concerning the prospect of more
regulations is that they are likely to preempt state laws, as many federal
regulations do. Preemption may deter some state AG's from using their
new privileges under the special solicitude rule if the state would prefer
to have its own regulations instead of federal rules that do not take
account of local needs. On the other hand, there are many instances
where state laws encounter preemption problems even where the agency
is silent, because the area is clearly within the agency's domain (this was
the crux of the problem in Massachusetts v. EPA). In addition,
depending on the individual AG's political affiliation and position
toward controversial state laws, triggering federal rulemaking may be a
tool for the state AG to eliminate state laws that are out of favor with the
AG's party or constituents.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court created a new standing rule in Massachusetts v.
EPA. This "special solicitude" rule gives states a favored status when
369. See id. at xlv (Preface to Fourth Edition); see also supra note 354 and comments
therein.
370. See SIMON, supra note 360 at 194-95.
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bringing suits against federal administrative agencies. The most direct
and immediate beneficiaries of the special solicitude rule are the state
Attorneys General, through whom the states litigate. Given the
unfettered discretion and independence that AG's have in deciding when
to litigate and which position to adopt, the special solicitude rule
transforms their offices into positions of national importance. The
altered status of the state AG also changes the stakes in their local
elections, the type of candidates who are likely to run and win, and the
degree of cooperation and competition with their counterparts
371elsewhere.
In the landscape of public-interest litigation, the special solicitude
rule creates a type of zero sum game for the public's choice of legal
representatives. By conferring special litigation status on the state AG's,
the Court diminished the litigation role of private activist groups by
comparison. While activist groups may still participate in the cases
along with the states, the lead party in a case would preferably be a state
(via its AG), because the state is better able to cross the hurdles of the
standing requirements.
Massachusetts v. EPA augments the special solicitude rule by
redrawing the boundaries of judicial deference and agency discretion. In
seeming contrast to earlier precedents, the Court held that agencies have
substantially less discretion regarding their refusal to regulate than they
do about when and how to enforce regulations. This distinction further
tips the scales toward the states, who not only have assurances of
standing, but also have an invitation to compel federal agencies to
regulate new areas where they have been previously silent.372 This new
371. After the Massachusetts case, another court took a step further augmenting
the role of a state Attorney General as part of the post-Katrina litigation against
federal agencies (primarily the Army Corps of Engineers). On August 24, 2007,
New Orleans-based U.S. District Judge Stanwood Duval appointed state
Attorney General Charles Foti Jr. to bring suit on behalf of thousands of still-
unrepresented flood victims who were at risk of missing their deadline to file
claims. See, e.g., Susan Finch, Judge Appoints Foti to File Suit: Case to Cover
Litigants without Attorneys, The Times-Picayune (Aug. 25, 2007), available at
the following: http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/metro/index.ssf?/base/news-
23/1188024886183440.xml&coll=1. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit voided the
decision of the district judge in a succinct unpublished opinion:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/07/07-30762%200.wpd.pdf. The
court gave no explanation except that the district court lacked authority to assign
claimants to the AG as their designated counsel; no mention was made of the
authority of the AG himself.
372. As this article was going to print, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in
Texas v. United States, _ F.3d -, 2007 WL 2340781 (5th Cir. 2007), granting
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superior position for compelling rulemaking should lead to an increase in
the quantity or number of federal regulations. Increased regulation raises
compliance costs for the regulated industry, but can also benefit the
affected parties by increasing their share values, as there is less
regulatory uncertainty. In addition, regulations impose some constraints
on the agencies themselves, by setting boundaries for enforcement and
by diverting agency resources away from enforcement to promulgate
more regulations. Further, the inevitable administrative overlap that
results from more rulemaking can dilute the burdens of the new rules on
the regulated industry. These factors-enhanced share values and
diluted enforcement effects-should be considerations in the cost-benefit
analysis of the EPA's forthcoming regulations on greenhouse gas
emissions.
the state of Texas (via the office of its Attorney General, of course) standing to
sue the Secretary of the Interior to stop an administrative proceeding regarding
an Indian casino application before the Secretary had issued a final decision.
Although the decision nowhere cites Massachusetts v. EPA, it seems to follow
that case's approach of special solicitude for states, at least regarding standing to
sue the federal government. The majority opinion in Texas v. U.S. seems to rely
heavily on Eleventh Amendment arguments that state sovereignty creates unique
circumstances where courts could find an injury-in-fact that would not apply to
private parties (or tribes, for that matter). The "injury in fact" that the state
alleged was more intangible and speculative than the harm alleged in
Massachusetts: Texas contended that the Secretary of Interior's haven-of-last-
resort approach for the tribes weakened the state's bargaining position with
Indian tribes and subjected the state to an unnecessary, protracted
administrative proceeding. Unlike Massachusetts, this case did not involve an
agency refusal to promulgate rules, but rather a state trying to prevent an agency
from promulgating rules.
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